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DEDICATION
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racial-ethnicities on Dexter was when we entered store fronts and gave our money for shoddy
goods, received our inferior education, or when we were accosted by law enforcement. I
understood that I lived in a colony before I understood what a colony was. Dexter taught me that
our salvation will only come from a collective effort from oppressed people struggling for change.
This dissertation is proof that roses grow in concrete.
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1. CHAPTER-INTRODUCTION: WHERE WE ARE
For marginalized groups, the possibility for alliances with other disadvantaged groups may
seem attractive and may be thought to be a means to salvation. Martin Luther King Jr. himself saw
interracial coalitions as a liberating tool to radically transform the nation. In 1968, the year of his
death, he and his organization, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), scrambled
to bring together Black organizations, feminist groups, working-class white organizations, and
Latinx activist groups to challenge the phenomenon that he believed threatened them all, poverty
(Mantler 2015). Before King, Thurgood Marshall worked closely with Mexican civil rights groups
on segregation, writing briefs on and sharing notes for the Mendez v. Westminster case that
challenged segregation of Mexican students in California (Foley 2010). King and Marshall’s
attempts at collaboration with possibly their closest class and racial ally in Latinx individuals,
would be later mimicked in some form by leaders such as Fred Hampton and Jesse Jackson, both
dubbing their alliances a “Rainbow Coalition (Mantler 2015).” Today, the Moral Monday
campaign led by the Rev. Willie Barber of Greensboro, NC adopts a similar interracial and
interfaith approach to coalition building through shared interests (Wootson Jr. 2017).
However, these rainbow coalitions were, and are, often short-lived as pressing issues divide
Blacks and Latinx or Hispanic groups. Many of these concerns revolved around competition,
intergroup racism, and diverse understandings of the challenges each group faces. Foley (2010)
writes that Mexican claims to whiteness, and more importantly their insistence on non-Blackness,
often proved insurmountable for potential coalition formations. Even in the Supreme Court
Mendez that preceded Brown v. Board of Education, the defense did not advocate for the end of
segregation based on racial discrimination towards a minority group. They instead claimed that
Mexicans were indeed White and since there was no specific law banning them from white schools

2

as there was for Blacks, they should be admitted (Ibid). Blacks, on the other hand, held suspicions
that Mexicans would form partnerships with white workers to exclude them from seemingly scarce
jobs (Ibid). Similar issues arose during the planning stages of King’s interracial “Poor People’s
March” (Mantler 2015). Contemporary thinking would hold that because Hispanic Americans and
African Americans occupy similar class and racialized positions, that they would naturally ally
themselves with one another. However, historically this has not been the case. Similar challenges
persist today in interracial faith-based coalitions like MOSES of Detroit and PICO of San
Bernadino, CA in encouraging Blacks and Hispanics to form coalitions to champion one another’s
issues. These contemporary endeavors will likely encounter similar obstacles as those heretofore
mentioned.
The discipline of social psychology can prove invaluable in many different areas of society
concerning racial-ethnic competition and coalition building. The field of social psychology
includes models that place “emphasis on the individual’s connection to and embeddedness in the
larger social context, the individual’s absorption of cultural and ideological norms, and the
individual’s desire to fit in and become an accepted member of the social community” (Sidanius
and Pratto 1999: 15). Much of the early work in social psychology focuses on the opinions and
behaviors of white Americans to the detriment of the discipline. Because of the heavy emphasis
on white’s attitudes exclusively, our understanding of the sociological factors associated with the
views of racial-ethnic minorities is limited at a time when the United States is becoming
increasingly racially and ethnically diverse. Overall, while studies of intergroup relations between
various minority groups have been increasingly published over the last two decades, there still
have been too few studies about how non-white groups view other non-whites. This dissertation
seeks to address the gap in knowledge in social psychology concerning racial-ethnic minorities by
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explicitly investigating factors related to their attitudes towards other non-whites and race-based
policies.
In carrying out its goals, the dissertation looks to challenge some assumptions that have
come up historically as well as contemporarily when individuals discuss the potential for
partnerships between racial minorities, Hispanic and Blacks specifically. The first assumption is
that Blacks and Hispanic, both racially marginalized groups, have shared interests that make them
prone to form coalitions to combat white racial domination. The second assumption is that within
these groups are common motivations that inform their socio-political perspectives despite internal
demographic characteristics (e.g., class, immigration status and racial affiliation for Hispanics).
Sociologists have long discarded notions of race as a biological construct that can predict the
behaviors and attitudes of racialized groups. However, even with the discipline generally affirming
race as a social construct, we still often tend to generalize and project behaviors and attitudes to
these groups based mainly on skin color. Whether biological or sociological factors are being
considered, it still may be unwise to assume that any of these factors lead groups to hold uniform
positions.
LITERATURE ON BLACK AND BROWN RELATIONS
Even within racial-ethnicities, some factors cause internal divisions. For decades Hispanic
Americans have been more likely than any other ethnic or racial group to have a relative that
originates from a foreign country. However, historians have demonstrated that the question of
citizenship has not only been a point of contention for groups such as Blacks and whites, but also
for Hispanic groups themselves. Mantler (2015) highlights the anti-illegal immigration stance of
major Latinx civil rights groups like the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) and
the American GI Federation (AGIF). These organizations petitioned against illegal immigration
while lobbying against discrimination against Hispanics on the grounds that they were loyal
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citizens and white patriots (Foley 2010; Mantler 2015). Joanna Dreby (2015) highlights the
difficulties that arise within Hispanic families over citizenship status. Undocumented migrants
often experience conflict with intimate partners and children who have citizenship status that they
sometimes deploy to exercise control over the migrant’s behavior. Contemporary research
conducted by Pew (2008) finds that Hispanics are more concerned than Black Americans about
the possible adverse outcome of immigration. Thus, in this study, I choose to disaggregate
Hispanics by nativity—between those born in the US and those born outside the US—to compare
their views as two separate groups with interests that sometimes diverge from one another.
Research that looks at intergroup relations between Blacks and Hispanics tend to focus on
points of commonality and competition between these groups (Kun and Pulido 2014; Telles et al.
2011). These studies find that most Hispanics and Blacks view themselves as having common
interests with Black Americans, but these results are mediated by region (Jones-Correa 2011) and
nativity (Mindiola Jr. et al. 2002). Jones-Correa (2011) finds that Hispanics in traditional receiving
states, as Latin immigration is concerned, like New York, Texas, and California are more likely to
view themselves as having more than less in common with African Americans regarding
socioeconomics and politics than Hispanics in new receiving states like Arkansas, Iowa, Georgia,
and North Carolina. However, higher scores of commonality measurements with Blacks were also
correlated with higher scores of perceived competition measures with Blacks among Hispanics.
Bobo and Hutchings (1996) study of intergroup competition found that while both Blacks and
Hispanics perceive themselves to compete with one another, they perceive themselves to be more
in competition with Asians and white Americans. More recent studies find that perceptions of
competition with Hispanics tend to evoke distinct political behaviors among Blacks when they are
made aware of the increasing presence of Latinx in the United States (Craig and Richeson 2017;
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Abascal 2015). These studies find that Blacks political perspectives undergo a conservative shift
when presented with information on population influxes of Latinx, and they begin to identify
themselves more with Americanism than with their racial-ethnic group exclusively. These findings
seem to be consistent for both whites and Asians, but not Hispanics.
Given current segregation patterns and the fact that when Blacks experience integration,
they tend not to live near whites, but other racial-minorities such as Hispanics (Sampson and
Sharkey 2011; Massey and Denton 1993), the population increases of that demographic may be
viewed as a threat to the political and economic stability of an already vulnerable African
American community. As such, Blacks may attempt to press the only advantage they have over
many Hispanics—the claim of American citizenship. Scholars have found this strategy to be
enacted by Blacks in places like Texas during the early to mid-twentieth century to prevent
themselves from being displaced by Latin workers through the Bracero program of the Roosevelt
administration (Foley 2010). Other research underscores factors like the belief that the government
uses immigrants to foster anti-Black racism and economic instability for Blacks to explain the antiimmigration stances of African Americans (Nteta 2014).
In light of this information, it would seem that Black’s stances on the presence of
immigrants or Hispanics, or both, is not a reflection of a conservative shift in political attitudes
like those seen among whites, but a strategy to enhance racial equality for themselves. Moreover,
if this is true, the same patterns may exist among Hispanics themselves if scholars took measures
to disaggregate the group by nativity and observed the variances in their perceptions. Moreover,
the racial fluidity among the US Hispanic population (i.e., Hispanics can identify as white, Black,
or other race) adds another interesting dynamic to the study of social psychological perceptions
among the group and how these identities relate to the different stances they take on policy issues.
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THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE
Racial Formation
Latinx or Hispanic Americans have a different American experience from those of Blacks
who have primarily been treated as a monolith. Theirs is a history of certain factions within those
ethnicities attempting to separate themselves in hopes to enjoy the benefits of citizenship. It is
possible, and may even be likely, that Blacks would have done the same if only they were allowed.
Nevertheless, scholars must place these divisions between groups and within groups under
greater scrutiny. Racial formation theory posits that historical, social, and political acts have led to
groups of people being racialized that did not previously view themselves as such (Omi and Winant
1994). Individuals of similar backgrounds are grouped together to serve political purposes relevant
to the times. Construction of various groups as "Other" served the purpose of mobilizing White
animus in solidarity to justify the exploitation and alienation of said groups via slavery,
colonialism, genocide, and displacement. The process of racial formation not only assigns race to
groups that previously did not identify as such, but it also leads to those groups adopting those
ethnoracial identities in efforts to survive. However, racial formations change over time. As seen
with Arab Americans, social and political acts over periods can alter the ethnoracial assignment of
a group (Jamal and Naber 2008). Consequently, I argue that historical efforts to separate Hispanic
migrants from citizens has coincided with the creation of two distinct groups with similar origins.
These groups hold different political attitudes that may be at odds with each other and at odds with
other racialized groups that they may share class positions with (i.e., Blacks).
Despite their similar material conditions, Blacks and Latinx espouse divergent opinions on
various political issues (Pew Research Center 2008, McClain et al. 2006; Mindiola et al. 2002).
These public opinions vary even more when Hispanics are disaggregated by nationality. These
disagreements range from issues concerning welfare, abortion rights, and immigration. Black
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Americans typically express more liberal stances than Hispanics in these areas while foreign-born
Hispanics tend to be the most conservative group of the three (i.e., Blacks, US-born Hispanics,
and foreign-born Hispanics). Also, foreign-born Hispanics tend to feel more negatively towards
Blacks than US-born Hispanics (Mindiola et al. 2002) while US Hispanics feel closer to Blacks
but also in more competition with that group than foreign-born Hispanics (Jones-Correa 2011).
These findings suggest that nationality and not just racial-ethnic status may have some bearing on
the way individuals structure their attitudes towards racial and political issues that have significant
implications. The vast differences between foreign-born Hispanics' home country and the US
might make them view the US opportunity structure more favorably and groups who still
underachieve (i.e., Black Americans) more negatively. US-born Hispanics and Black Americans,
having no other country as a reference, could be more pessimistic about the state of political affairs
in the US and thus more positive towards groups who underachieve. The difference in national
status over racial, ethnic similarities may associate with US-born Hispanics holding opinions more
similar to Blacks than foreign-born Hispanics on specific issues. They may even view foreigners
as threatening to their material interests even though many US-born Hispanics have close family
that are migrants not yet naturalized.
Group Positions Theory
The passage above offers support for the group positions model of racial prejudice and will
be used to interpret the findings expected in these studies. The group positions model, developed
from Herbert Blumer's (1958) theory of race prejudice as a sense of group position, posits that
individuals view themselves as belonging to larger racial groups of which they share similar
phenotypes and socioeconomic and political interests. Since these individuals view themselves as
belonging to groups, they come to view people with different phenotypes as belonging to different
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racial groups with competing interests to their own. The group that dominates resources is viewed
as the in-group (e.g., whites in the U.S.) while the group that finds themselves struggling to gain
control of resources is viewed as the out-group (e.g., Blacks and Hispanics in the U.S.). Influxes
in the frequency of the out-group are thought to produce increased racial antagonism and prejudice
among members of the in-group as they view their dominant material and ideological position as
being threatened. This point is realized via the resistance of in-groups to social policies that
redistribute power and privilege to out-groups (Bobo et al. 1996; Bobo and Kluegel 1993; Bobo
1991).
The group positions model has found consistent empirical support in public opinion
research studying white American’s racial attitudes. However, there has also been empirical
support that demonstrates that the theory can be extended to racial minorities (Bobo and Hutchings
1996). Though Latinx or Hispanic citizens have struggled to differentiate themselves from
undocumented migrants of similar origins in the eyes of Whites and Blacks, the issue of citizenship
has also repeatedly been a hindrance to solidarity within these groups. While injustices such as
Jim Crow legislation have uniformly disadvantaged all or most Black Americans, individuals of
Latinx origin have a unique history that has divided their interests and often stunted collective
action against injustice. Foley (2010) writes
Mexican Americans, on the other hand, have a long history of organizing in the
Southwest and the upper Midwest as industrial and agricultural workers, middle-class
professionals, and immigrants, but never as a single, cohesive ethnic group that prevailed
over regional and class differences, much less citizenship (57).
He goes on to conclude that “stark differences separated Mexican Americans from Mexican
immigrants, even as language, culture, and ancestral history bound them together (57).” The two
quotes are telling. Within the African American community, studies have demonstrated that
individuals hold similar attitudes and positions on political matters. Some studies even show that
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despite internal class differences, middle and upper-class Blacks still feel a sense of responsibility
owed to lower and working-class Blacks (Patillo 2007). These patterns may be due to a history
that includes near uniform exclusion from citizenship rights, be a person slave or free (Baptist
2014), vulnerability under a Jim Crow system of terror that could bring about violence to any
Black person at a moment’s notice, and the fact that many middle and upper-class Blacks live close
or in the same neighborhoods as poor Blacks (Patillo 2007). Even if middle or upper-middle class
Blacks escape poor ghettoes, they have about a seventy percent chance to fall back to those
neighborhoods (Sharkey 2011).
While they are of course various ties that bind Hispanics in the US, various other factors
may place their interest at odds with one another. Studies demonstrate that the opinions of USborn Hispanics and foreign-born Hispanics are anything but uniform (Mindiola Jr. et al. 2002).
Their stances on issues such as childcare, welfare, and competition and commonality with Blacks
diverge from one another (Ibid.). Some scholars have interpreted conservative opinions of
Hispanics as evidence that they may be unfit as allies for African Americans. Treating the group
as two separate groups may uncover differences in opinions on pressing political topics and
provide greater insight on how they position themselves politically and the factors involved in
those stances.
The benefits of using group positions theory to view social inequality are (1) it theorizes
how social structure helps to shape psychological and socially consequential behavior and (2) it
provides a synthesis of racial prejudice models that have been treated as antagonistic or mutually
exclusive (Bobo 1999). Group position theory makes the central claim that prejudice involves
more than simple stereotypes and negative feelings but a claim to the relative positioning of groups
in a racialized order. Bobo (1999) argues that “there is an intrinsically collective or group-based
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dimension to racial prejudice generally, and to modern issues of racial politics in specific (448).”
He goes on to assert that “the bedrock assumption of the group positions model is that the dominant
group's members must make an effectively important distinction between themselves and
subordinate group members (449)." This dissertation argues that internal divisions among
Hispanics in the US such as nativity and racial identification play an essential role in how these
groups perceive policy, which could have significant consequences for potential alliances with
other racial-ethnic groups like Blacks and whites. Population predictions that indicate that the
United States will be a majority-minority country by the year 2050 make endeavors such as these
all the more immediate.
Although I adopt the group positions model as the theoretical framework for this
dissertation, I do not altogether reject other quality theories like Social Dominance Theory (SDT)
and Social Identification Theory (SIT) that have been used to interpret empirical data for studies
of intergroup relations. Many of the central claims made by both theories overlap with those of the
group positions model and the way I intend to use it here. For example, SDT's emphasis on social
dominance orientation (e.g., socialization, group status, gender, etcetera) and how this leads to
individual's adoption of legitimizing myths like racism, sexism, etcetera (Sidanius and Pratto 1999)
will be explored in detail. Likewise, SIT's insistence on conditions that shape the way individuals
identify with groups as a predictor of discriminatory attitudes towards outgroups (Abascal 2015;
Tajfel and Turner 1986) is a focal point of this dissertation. However, this dissertation takes a
social-structural approach to analyze group attitudes. Individual's orientation and the positions they
accept along with the way they identify themselves cannot be removed from larger macrosociological processes that create the environment from which they derive. As such, exclusively
psychological theories like SIT have the potential to obscure essential contextual realities for
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which individuals and groups navigate. Also, SDT has been utilized to study perspectives rooted
in group conflict and oppression (Sidanius and Pratto 1999). While some positions taken on policy
preferences included in this dissertation may be rooted in group-based oppression, others may
merely reflect ideas about the material stability of the group of the respondent and not so much
ongoing attempts at bias towards outgroups. I believe that these essential points, among others,
make the group positions model the best framework for analyzing results from the studies this
dissertation intends to include.
PLAN FOR DISSERTATION
This dissertation adopts a three-article style format. Each empirical chapter will be
reflective of articles that regularly appear in scholarly journals. Each chapter will have a specific
theme; however, they all will attempt to build on the findings of one another by extending the
applicability of the group positions model, the social identity threat hypothesis and the common
ingroup identity model to Blacks, US-born Hispanics, and foreign-born Hispanics. A more detailed
description of the dissertation format follows:
•

Chapter Two: Using Group Positions Theory to Understand Black and Hispanic
Immigration Preferences
o The first study investigates the relationship between racial-ethnicity and nativism.
It assesses whether the factors associated with anti-immigration preferences are
consistent across racial-ethnic groups using data from the National Politics Study
(NPS). Of the groups involved in the study (whites, Blacks, US-born Hispanics,
and foreign-born Hispanics), a fairer immigration policy stands to benefit the
Hispanic groups most. The study measures how groups position themselves in
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opposition to one another based on zero-sum competition and how this positioning
moderates immigration policy preferences
•

Chapter Three: Using Perceptions of Political Actions to Predict Commonality among
Minorities
o This study utilizes perceptions of discrimination and perceptions of political actions
necessary for fostering change to estimate commonality between Latinx Americans
and other racial-ethnic groups. Interaction effects are used to predict if the effect of
perceptions of discrimination on commonality differs based on one’s affinity for
radical political means.

•

Chapter Four: Using CIIM to Predict Political Attitudes for Race-Based Policy Initiatives
o This study uses general perceptions of discrimination toward racial-ethnic
minorities and political activity to estimate political attitudes for race-based policy
initiatives like racial profiling, detainment of undocumented immigrants and
affirmative action. Interactive effects test whether the effect of perceptions of
discrimination toward minorities is moderated by one’s level of political activity.

•

Chapter Five: Conclusion
o These studies contribute to existing literature in social psychology by extending the
use of theories mainly developed from the study of white American attitudes to
other racial-ethnic groups in the US. They do not seek to mimic earlier work on
white Americans merely but to discuss in greater detail the nuances of these theories
and how they must be uniquely adjusted when groups such as Blacks and Hispanics
are considered.
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o Finally, this research provides insight to individuals engaged in social justice work
in various racial-ethnic minority communities. It provides information on areas
where the interests of multiple groups align and areas where they disagree. This
information could be used to help these communities bridge gaps with one another
on important issues that affect them similarly.
o These studies have several limitations. The data from the NPS was gathered during
the years 2004 and 2008. While it would be optimal to have more recent data, the
most critical objective of the research is to observe the patterns among the various
groups concerning policy preferences and the factors shaping those preferences.
With the political climate over the past ten years since the data were collected, it is
likely that anti-immigrant stances and anti-affirmative action stances may have
indeed increased.
o Future studies will seek to expand the racial-ethnic groups observed to include Arab
Americans and foreign-born Blacks and whites. These groups are quickly
increasing in number in the US and thus should have their opinions considered.
Later work should also seek to test factors related to positions on other policies that
have racially disproportionate implications such as criminal justice preferences,
social security, trade policy, and military interventions. Studying such policy
positions could provide insight into the social psychological factors involved in the
shaping a range of political attitudes.
SAMPLE
This dissertation is a quantitative project that relies on data from the National Politics
Surveys (NPS) from 2004, 2008 and 2012, and the 2012 Latino Second Generation Survey. Both
surveys are nationally representative studies of noninstitutionalized individuals aged 18 and over.
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When describing the NPS, the principal investigators state that “the primary goal of NPS was to
gather comparative data about individuals' political attitudes, beliefs, aspirations, and behaviors at
the beginning of the 21st century (Jackson et al. 2008).” A strength of the both surveys is that they
include large samples of racial-ethnic minorities which provide the statistical power for
quantitative methods to reveal both statistically and substantively significant variances if they
indeed exist.
DISCUSSION
The United States looks markedly different from how it appeared some thirty years ago. It
was then a mostly White nation followed by a small proportion of African Americans as the second
most represented group. The nation is now increasingly Black and Brown, with estimates that in
the next thirty years or so Whites will no longer be the majority group (i.e., over 50 percent of the
population). Scholars, activists, and political actors alike have all weighed in on the implications
of these demographic changes. While some on the political left may see them as an opportunity to
build strong alliances or minority coalitions to challenge White hegemonic rule, politicians clamor
to court potential ever-expanding voting constituencies. During the 2016 Presidential election,
Democrats seemed confident that they would overwhelmingly win the Latinx vote. This prediction
was undoubtedly guided by polls demonstrating that traditionally lower-class minority groups such
as Blacks and Latinx generally vote democrat, as well as the nativist rhetoric deployed by then
Republican candidate Donald Trump at the expense of Mexican migrants.
Activists such as Malcolm X have long observed that in Presidential elections, the White
vote typically splits among the two major parties, and the minority vote, the Black vote in
Malcolm's era, often decides the winner. Black citizens for nearly half a century have resoundingly
voted Democrat, and with Trump's attacks on Mexicans, certainly, Hispanics would vote in similar
numbers. Estimates demonstrate that about half of every child classified as Hispanic has a parent
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that's an immigrant. There is also evidence that demonstrates that many US migrants arrive via
chain migration. Thus, Trump's strongly conservative proposals for immigration reform, even
suggesting building a wall along the US-Mexico border, seemed sure to gain Democrats the
Mexican vote and with it, other Latinx citizens who fall under the Hispanic umbrella.
The result was entirely different, however. The Democratic nominee Hilary Clinton won
the Black and Hispanic vote, but not by the margins needed to secure enough electoral votes to
win the presidency. She won a smaller share of these votes than former President Barack Obama
in both 2008 and 2012. Obama's first election may have been an aberration, given the significance
of electing a Black President for the first time in history, but his share of the Black vote in 2012
was still seven percent higher than that of Clinton's and eight percent higher for Hispanics (Pew
Research Center 2016). Not only did Clinton win a smaller share of these minority voters, but she
also turned out less of these voters than 2012 rates. While Hispanic voters fell marginally from 48
percent to 47.6 percent, Black voter turnout decreased by seven percent, from 66.6 percent in 2012
to 59.6 percent in 2016 (Pew Research Center 2016).
This dissertation does not seek to address the intricacies of the 2016 Presidential election
but to examine some of the underlying broader assumptions revealed by the Democratic strategy
in that election as it pertains to minority voters, namely Black and Brown voters. These
assumptions have implications that far transcend electoral politics.
2. CHAPTER: GROUP POSITIONS BEYOND THE BINARY: IMMIGRATION
ATTITUDES AMONG BLACK, HISPANIC AND WHITE AMERICANS
Over the past sixty years, the nature of racial prejudice in the United States has shifted;
today, far fewer white Americans espouse a belief in the biological superiority of whites compared
to the 1950s (Schuman et al 1997; Bobo 1999; Hunt 2007). However, this shift in racial attitudes

16

has not led to a wide acceptance of progressive social policies that would potentially ameliorate
racial inequality; instead whites continue to oppose racially progressive social policies but base
their opposition on ostensibly race neutral grounds (Sniderman and Carmines 1997). For instance,
rather than racial animus, many whites today oppose racial social policies based on the principle
that the government should not intervene in providing equality of outcomes (Bobo, Kluegel, and
Smith 1997; Krysan 2000). As researchers have attempted to understand this paradox of why a
decline in prejudice has not lead to an increase in support for racially progressive social policies,
a large body of research has developed which has sought to determine the covariates of racial
social policy attitudes (Bobo and Kluegel 1993; Bobo 1999, Quillian 1995; Hutchings and Wong
2014; Krysan 2000; Fusell 2014; Berg 2015). This research has shown that a variety of factors
including self-interest, perceptions of group economic and political threat from racial outgroups,
and racial affect each play a role in shaping racial policy attitudes. To date, most of this research
has been conducted within the black-white binary as researchers have been primarily interested in
white Americans’ attitudes towards racial policies that would benefit black Americans such as
busing and affirmative action (Krysan 2000; Fusell 2014). However, as the US becomes more
diverse and the racial order shifts (Saperstein and Penner 2013), it is important for scholars to
expand the purview of racial policy attitudes research to understand how individuals of varying
racial backgrounds1 assess social policies that may benefit different racial groups.
For example, one specific racial policy which has been the focus of racially tinged debates
for decades is immigration. Conservatives in these debates have painted immigrants, particularly
undocumented Hispanic immigrants, as a nefarious out-group that may threaten the economic

1

1. Despite the distinction between Hispanic as an ethnicity and white and black as races made by the US
government, recent research indicates that most Americans see these concepts as interchangeable and their impacts
in shaping lives are very similar (Saperstien and Penner 2013). Following this approach, we use the term race to
refer to white, black and Hispanic groups.
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well-being and safety of native-born US Americans. This issue became particularly contentious
during the 2016 presidential campaign when then candidate Donald Trump drew on antiimmigrant sentiment and made his impracticable plan to build a wall along the entire southern
border of the US a signature issue in his campaign. After Trump’s surprise victory in the 2016
presidential election, a media narrative developed which cast the 2016 election as an electoral
revolt wherein the festering frustrations of the white working class bubbled over and upended
conventional political wisdom (West 2016).
This narrative attributed white working animosity towards immigrants and Trump’s
subsequent electoral victory to two primary drivers. First, whites blamed their poor economic
predicaments and declining standard of living on undeserving minorities including undocumented
Mexican immigrants who they view as robbing them of their proprietary claim to economic and
political power (West 2016). Second, the electoral revolt was aided by a lingering menace of racial
prejudice among working class whites, who participated in a “whitelash,” against the nation’s first
black President (Blake 2016). Thus, the media portrayed white Americans as uniquely nativist and
sensitive to both economic threats and racial dog whistles when evaluating immigrants. This
general narrative is supported by empirical research which indicates that Trump’s victory was
indeed attributable in part to strong support from white working-class voters and that voters who
viewed immigration as an important social issue were the most likely to support Trump (Morgan
and Lee 2018; Roper Poll 2017).
However, this framing of anti-immigration sentiment being solely associated with whites
somewhat ignores the patterns found in research literature regarding the objective consequences
of immigration on racial minorities. Research suggests that whites are only marginally impacted
by immigration (Borjas et al. 2010) with the brunt of the negative consequences falling on Black
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Americans (Shihadeh and Barranco 2010). Moreover, since immigrants from Latin America often
gain employment in low skilled labor sectors, black and Hispanic citizens, who are more likely to
be represented among the poor and working classes, disproportionately feel the economic
consequences of immigration. Thus, it follows that any native born American regardless of racial
identity may oppose immigration because immigrants could potentially be perceived as a
racialized out-group which threatens their economic and social standing. However, relatively few
studies have explored how racial minorities in America think about immigration or whether the
factors that predict immigration attitudes vary by race, as the bulk of the research literature on
immigration attitudes has focused primarily on the attitudes of white Americans (Schacter 2016;
Flores and Schachter 2018; Berg 2010) or in some cases white and Black Americans (Hutchings
and Wong 2014).
Additionally, the situation becomes more complicated when we consider that over a third
of Hispanics in the US are foreign-born, a status which may inform their opinions on racial social
policies including immigration (Waters 1999). For example, research has demonstrated that
foreign-born Hispanics view African Americans more negatively and as having less commonality
to themselves than US-born Hispanics (Mindiola et al. 2002; McClain 2006). However, the bulk
of extant research on immigration attitudes rarely even includes Hispanic Americans let alone
disaggregates then by foreign-born status. Thus, little is known about whether the immigration
attitudes of Hispanic immigrants diverge from US born Hispanics.
This paper seeks to address these gaps in the research literature by investigating two main
questions. First, we ask, what are the immigration attitudes of white, Black, native-born Hispanic
and foreign-born Hispanic Americans? Secondly, we ask, do race and nativity2 moderate the

2

Throughout this paper, we use the term nativity to refer to country of birth (US or foreign-born)
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impact that self-interest, economic and political threat, and affect toward racial outgroups play in
shaping immigration policy attitudes? This research contributes to existing literatures on racial
policy attitudes by investigating whether typical models that predict racial policy attitudes among
whites can be applied across racial and nativity categories.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Much of the sociological research on racial policy attitudes draws on Blumer’s (1958)
theory of racial prejudice as a sense of group position. This approach posits that individuals’
attitudes about race derive from their view of the positioning of their own racial in-group in relation
to racial out-groups. For Blumer, racial prejudice or negative feelings about racial out-groups arise
from the following four necessary conditions: 1)a feeling of superiority, 2) a belief that the
subordinate group is alien and different, 3) a sense of proprietary claims over certain rights,
statuses, and resources, and finally 4) a perception of threat from subordinate group members.
Researchers who have applied this model to racial policy attitudes assert that opposition to racial
policies is not due to an adherence to fundamental moral principles or even emotional dislike for
racial minorities, but are instead due to a perception that benefits for racial outgroups represent a
threat to the group interest of the racial in-group (Bobo 1999). For instance, the model indicates
that opposition to immigration is not based on an adherence to abstract principles (e.g., belief in
national sovereignty), or a dislike of immigrants, but is instead due to the perception that
immigrants pose a threat to the relative position of their racial in-group.
Social psychologists have expanded Blumer's original theory to include not only dominant
racial groups in society (e.g., white Americans) but also minorities such as Asian, Black, and
Latino or Hispanic Americans (Bobo and Massagali 2001; Bobo and Hutchings 1996). These
scholars argue that minorities view members of other minority groups as political and economic
threats and subsequently support policies that have the effect of excluding those groups from
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competing for scarce resources. Based on this theoretical framework, it may follow that Black,
US-born and foreign-born Hispanic Americans will espouse negative views toward immigration
if they hold negative opinions of racial outgroups or believe that immigrants pose a threat to the
economic or political standing of their own racial group.
However, given obdurate white hegemony in United States, we question whether the same
patterns that characterize white Americans will be operative among racial minorities. Namely,
given the unique position of whites at the top of the US racial hierarchy, it is possible that white’s
immigration attitudes will be associated with a variety of threats to their economic and political
standing, whereas policy attitudes among Black and US born Hispanic Americans will be primarily
related to threats immigrants pose to their own self-interest and animosity toward racial outgroups.
In the empirical models presented below, we test whether common predictors of racial policy
attitudes among whites also shape the immigration attitudes of black, US born and foreign-born
Hispanic Americans.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Given that the most prominent models used to explain racial policy attitudes are based on
the premise that individuals oppose these policies due to a feeling of threat from racialized
outgroups, research in this area is characterized by studies that use a variety of operationalizations
of individual, group, and contextual threat to predict policy attitudes (Krysan 2000). For example,
one of the primary predictors of racial policy attitudes such as immigration is perceived individual
threat, often operationalized as economic self-interest (Kluegel and Smith 1986; Bobo and
Hutchings 1996; Berg 2015). This reasoning suggests that individuals are generally opposed to
policies that they believe will have a negative impact on their personal economic well- being. In
the context of immigration, the self-interest model suggests that individuals whose employment
situations would be the most adversely affected by increased immigration would be the most likely
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to oppose increased immigration, a logic that leads to self-interest being operationalized simply as
individual SES or with contextual variables that gauge the amount of immigration in an
individual’s geographic area (Berg 2009; Berg 2015; Kunovich 2017).
However, we argue that it is also important to gauge the subjective nature of self-interest
in shaping attitudes towards immigration. Given the degree to which the immigration issue has
been demagogued in the past several decades (Brown 2016), many Americans may believe that
increasing immigration could be a hindrance to their own economic well-being even if there is
little objective immigrant threat based on SES or geography. Indeed, the literature generally
indicates that subjective views of how immigrants effects an individual socioeconomic standing
are stronger determinants of immigration attitudes than measures that gauge individuals’ objective
positioning (Ilias, Fennelly, and Federico 2008; Fennelly and Federico 2008). In other words, we
maintain that it matters less if individuals are materially disadvantaged by immigration and matters
more if they believe that immigrants pose a threat to their self-interest. Thus, in the empirical
models developed below, we utilize a measure of self-interest that gauges the subjective perception
of respondent’s belief that immigrants pose a direct threat to their own economic well-being.
A different conceptualization of threat is group threat, a concept that directly follows the
group positions model. Rather than gauging the perceived individual threat that a racial outgroup
poses to an individual, group threat measures tap the degree to which individuals view racial
outgroups as a threat to the economic and political standing of their own racial group (Bobo 1999).
The most common of these measures are “zero-sum” threat measures developed by Bobo and
colleagues (Bobo and Kluegel 1993; Bobo et a. 1997; Bobo 1999; Bobo 2000; Hutchings and
Wong 2014; Fussell 2014; Kyrsan 2000; Berg 2010, 2015). This body of research is fairly
consistent in showing that among whites, perceived group threat from racial outgroups is
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associated with opposition towards racial social policies. As noted above, what is less clear is
whether racial minorities will also base their attitudes towards immigration policy on a general
belief that racial outgroups pose an economic and political threat to their own groups.
Several studies have focused on Blacks and Hispanic views of commonality and
competition with one another. These studies generally find that both groups feel that they have
more rather than less in common with the opposite group in areas of socioeconomics and politics
(Jones-Correa 2011; Mindiola et al. 2002). These commonality attitudes differ, however, by the
history that states have with Hispanic immigration (Jones-Correa 2011) and by nationality
(Mindiola et al. 2002). Hispanics in states that have traditionally received Hispanic immigrants
reports higher levels of commonality and competition with African Americans than Hispanics in
states new immigration destinations in the southeastern US (Jones-Correa 2011). Moreover,
variables measuring greater assimilation (e.g., English speaking proficiency, citizenship status,
having Black friends or coworkers) correlates with both greater perceived commonality and
competition with African Americans.
Country of birth may play a role as well, as foreign-born Hispanics report less contact with
African Americans (Mindiola et al. 2002) and more perceived competition with Blacks than USborn Hispanics. However, but this perceived competition with Blacks is mainly reflective of their
perceptions of competition with other racial groups generally as Foreign-born Hispanics also
report higher perceived competition with other Hispanics than with Blacks (Morin et al. 2011).
Thus, while lack of familiarity is associated with foreign-born Hispanics being more susceptible
to stereotypical attitudes towards Blacks, greater familiarity may make them more susceptible to
perceived competition with other Hispanics. These patterns suggest that foreign-born Hispanics
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may also have a socioeconomic interest in restrictive immigration policies to insulate themselves
from increased labor competition.
Using an experimental design, Craig and Richeson (2018) find that when engaged with
content that emphasizes the influx of Hispanics in the population; non-Hispanic racial minorities
identify as more conservative and support more conservative positions; however they find no
evidence that Hispanics experience the same conservative shift under such conditions. Yet this
study is characteristic of the literature as they examine Hispanics as a monolith and do not separate
the group by nativity. Abascal (2015) similarly finds that African Americans tend to adopt a more
nationalist than racial identity under similar conditions later tested by Craig and Richeson. That is,
when presented with information suggesting that the proportion of foreign-born Hispanics is
behind the increase in population, Africans Americans score higher on scales measuring
conservatism than they did before being presenting with such information. While this research
places Blacks, whites, and Asians within the model, US-born Hispanics are not analyzed. This
research, while instructive, implicitly assumes that Hispanics generally do not feel threatened by
Hispanic immigration despite many empirical findings to the contrary.
Thus, the overall research literature paints a complex picture on whether black and US and
foreign-born Hispanic Americans view group-based competition with each other. Moreover, it
remains unclear if these perceptions of group-based competition lead to variation in policy
attitudes. As noted, the group positions model was developed to explain whites’ attitudes towards
subordinate groups; as such, applying the model directly to relations among minority groups may
be questionable. In particular, it is unclear if black and US-born Hispanic Americans will have
the same sense of proprietary claims over certain rights, statuses, and resources as white Americans
do. Given that it is this proprietary claim to the spoils of society that link perceptions of threat into
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opposition to racial policies, we question whether the policy attitudes of black and Hispanic
Americans will have the same association with perceptions of threat as whites do.
The final predictor of racial policy attitudes that we employ in our empirical models is
racial affect. As opposed to individual or group threat, racial affect refers to how people feel
emotionally about racial outgroups. In this context, affect is also different from prejudice as it is
an emotional rather than a cognitive concept. As noted by Krysan (2000) affect’s role in shaping
racial policy attitudes has been studied less often in sociology than measures of threat and or
measures of old fashioned or symbolic prejudice. However, the research that has investigated of
affect among whites has generally shown that affect does play a role in shaping racial policy
attitudes (Hughes 1997; Gilens; Kinder and Sanders 1996). Gilens found that negative feelings
generated towards Blacks was associated with opposition to welfare while Kinder and Sanders
(1996:291) found that whites who scored high on scales of symbolic racism, or "abstract,
moralistic racial resentments" concerning Blacks, were more likely to oppose policies with
perceived racial undertones such as fair employment, school desegregation, preferential hiring,
and college quotas.
Regarding affect among racial minorities, some studies have found Black resistance to
immigration to be less racialized in nature than whites’ opinions. Nteta (2014) suggests that Black
opposition to Hispanic immigration is driven by similar factors that were found to be associated
with their earlier opposition to white ethnic immigration (e.g., the Irish and Italians) in the 1900s.
These factors included political and economic competition, egalitarianism, the perception that new
immigrants seek to alienate Blacks, and the perception that racism fueled immigration policies.
Research on intergroup stereotypes finds that while Blacks hold some negative views of Hispanics,
they also view Hispanics as having positive qualities (Mindiola et al. 2002). For example, African
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Americans were found to believe that Hispanics were more family oriented and hardworking than
Blacks themselves. Hispanics have consistently been found to view Blacks more negatively than
Blacks view them (Mindiola et al. 2002) with some studies demonstrating that foreign-born
Hispanics view Blacks more negatively than both US-born Hispanics and whites (McClain et al.
2012). Here again, while the research literature has investigated how racial minorities view each
other, less research has looked at whether these views also translate into attitudes towards social
policies that putatively benefit particular racial groups. In the analyses that follow, we examine
whether racial affect shapes attitudes towards immigration among white, black, US born and
foreign-born Hispanic respondents.
DATA AND METHODS
Sample
This study utilizes data from the 2004 and 2008 National Politics Study (NPS). The NPS
is a nationally representative survey of non-institutionalized individuals, aged 18 and over,
designed to compile information on individuals' political opinions, aspirations and behaviors
concerning contemporary issues in U.S. politics (Jackson et al. 2008). One of the strengths of the
NPS is that it includes large enough samples of various racial groups in the U.S. For this study,
the NPS has a large enough sample of Hispanics to allow us to distinguish between native-born
respondents and foreign respondents for comparison to the other race groups.
For the 2004 survey, a total of 3,339 interviews were conducted from September 2004,
shortly before the presidential election, until February 2005. These interviews consisted of 756
African Americans, 919 non-Hispanic whites, 404 Caribbean blacks, and 503 Asian Americans.
The 2008 NPS was conducted from September 2008 to December 2008. There were fewer
completed interviews in 2008 compared to 2004. There were 1,477 respondents in total, which
included 519 non-Hispanic whites, 329 African Americans, 444 Hispanics, 88 Asian Americans,
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and 97 Caribbean blacks. Although both data sets include data from five racial groups, this study
is only concerned with the views of four groups: whites, blacks, US-born Hispanics, and foreignborn Hispanics. We utilize multiple imputations (M=10) to account for item-level missing data,
yielding a sample of 3,107 respondents.
Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics for all Variables
Variable
Nativism
NPS 2004 Control (1=Yes)
American Hispanic (1=Yes)
Black (1=Yes)
White (1=Yes)
Immigrant Hispanic (1=Yes)
Under 30 yrs of age (1=Yes)
Between 30 to 50 (1=Yes)
Low Income (1=Yes)
South (1=yes)
West (1=yes)
High School Dropout (1=Yes)
College Graduate (1=Yes)
Conservative (1=yes)
Parent US Born (1=yes)
Women (1=yes)
Racial Stratification Belief
Immigrants Take Jobs (1=Yes)
Outgroup Job Threat
Out Group Political Threat
Out group Closeness

Mean
2.12
.76
.15
.30
.34
.21
.17
.51
.53
.45
.20
.15
.30
.18
.74
.60
2.81
.34
2.00
2.11
2.67

SD
.62
1.52
.95
.98
.70

Source, National Politics Study (2004; 2008); N=3,071; Imputed Data
MEASURES
Dependent Variable: Attitudes Towards Immigration
Table 2.1 presents descriptive statistics for all analysis variables. Respondents were asked
one question to measure their attitudes towards immigration. The question asked if they believed
the U.S. government should increase immigration, leave it as it is, or decrease immigration. The
variable was coded so that higher values indicated greater opposition to immigration.
Independent Variable: Race/ Foreign Born Status
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The primary independent variable is the race/nativity of the respondent. As mentioned, this
study is interested in the views of whites, blacks, and both native and foreign-born Hispanics. We
coded Hispanic individuals who answered that they were raised or born in a foreign country as
foreign-born (immigrant) Hispanics while coding all other Hispanics as US-born Hispanics. The
number of blacks and whites who qualified as foreign-born under this coding was too small to
produce precise estimates; as such, they were excluded from the sample. This procedure yields a
four-category measure of race/nativity: US Born Hispanic, Black, White, and Immigrant Hispanic.
For the ordinal logistic regress models estimated below, we use foreign-born Hispanic as the
reference category.
Moderators
To measure self-interest, we use a question that asks respondents if they believe that
immigrants take jobs from American workers. The variable is dichotomous with an answer of
“yes” coded 1 and “no” coded 0.
Our second moderator assesses the degree to which respondents generally see racial
outgroups as a threat to their racial in-group’s economic security. All respondents ranked their
agreement on a four-point Likert scale with two items that said, "more jobs for
(blacks/whites/Hispanics) means fewer jobs for people like me," one for each outgroup (e.g., black
respondents were asked about whites and Hispanics). We averaged both of the outgroup measures
for each respondent to create a measure for general outgroup economic threat, with higher numbers
indicating more perceived outgroup job threat.
The third moderator measures outgroup political threat. This measure is parallel to the
economic threat measure. The respondents rated their agreement on a four-point Likert scale with
the statement “more political influence for (blacks/whites/Hispanics) means less political influence
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for people like me.” Again, the responses to the two items, one for each outgroup, were averaged
to create the measures of outgroup political threat with higher values indicating more political
threat.
Our final moderator is a measure of racial affect. All respondents were asked on a fourpoint scale how close they feel to whites, Blacks and Hispanics. For each respondent, we took the
average of respondents' ratings of the two racial outgroups. This procedure yields an outgroup
closeness measure coded so that higher numbers indicate a closer feeling to racial outgroups.
Control Variables
The multivariate models presented below also control for a variety of demographic factors
that may impact immigration attitudes. First, we control for age using two dummy variables. The
first dummy variable indexes those who are under 30 years of age (1=yes) and the second indexes
respondents who are between 30 and 50 years of age (1=yes), with respondents over 50 years old
serving as the reference category. We expect older individuals to display more opposition to
immigration than their younger counterparts. We control for economic standing using a variable
indexing low income (1=yes) individuals from their higher income counterparts. We expect that
low-income individuals will show more opposition to immigration than respondents with higher
incomes. We account for regional differences using two dummy variables for the south (1=yes)
and west (1=yes), comparing these regions to the rest of the country. Education is accounted for
using two dummy variables, which compare individuals who completed less than high school
(1=yes) and those who are college graduates (1=yes) to respondents with a high school diploma
only. We expect individuals with less than a high school diploma to display more opposition to
immigration, and those with a college degree to display less opposition to immigration compared
to respondents with a high school degree. Political ideology is indexed by a dummy variable
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comparing respondents who self-identified as conservative (1=yes) to those who identified as
either political moderate or liberal. Parent US-born (1=yes)3 compares individuals whose parents
were born in the US to second-generation immigrants. Women (1=Yes) compares women to men.
We expect women to be less opposed to immigration than men. Finally, racial stratification belief
is a measure of an individual's beliefs about the causes of racial stratification. This variable asks,
"If ethnic minorities are poor, they should blame themselves;" this variable ranges from 1 to 4,
with higher values indicating a greater endorsement of this statement. We expect individuals who
express greater endorsement of this item to display higher levels of opposition to immigration.
Table 2.2: Percentage Distribution of Nativism by Race-ethnicity
Total

Immigrant
Hispanic
22.8

US-Born
Hispanic
15.8

Black White

Increase Immigration
13.9
8.7
12.3
Keep Immigration the
59.4
68.7
59.6
59.2
53.7
Same
Decrease Immigration
26.7
8.5
24.7
32.2
34.0
N
3,071
645
450
933
1,043
Source NPS (2004; 2008) Imputed Data; Pooled from 10 imputations; chi square 184.921 p<.001
RESULTS
Table 2.2 shows the percentage distribution of immigration attitudes by race/nativity. Table
2 indicates that among the four groups, immigrant Hispanic respondents are the least nativist with
the highest percentage indicating that immigration should be increased (22.8%) and the lowest
percentage indicating that immigration should be decreased (8.5%). US-born Hispanics are the
second least nativist group with 24.7% suggesting that immigration should be decreased and 15.8%
support increasing immigration. Immigration attitudes among whites and blacks are similar. An

3

6.7% of immigrant Hispanic respondents, 64.2% of US Born Hispanic respondents, 98.8% of black respondents,
and 96.5% of white respondents had US-born parents. Models estimated without this variable were substantively
identical to those presented here.
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almost identical percentage of white (34.0%) and Black (32.2%) respondents favor decreasing
immigration, while somewhat more white respondents favor increasing (12.3%) immigration
compared to Black respondents (8.7%).

The multivariate models estimated below seek to

determine if this association remains after controlling for a variety of background variables and if
the sources of these attitudes vary by race/nativity.
Table 2.3: Cumulative Ordinal Logistic Regression Models for Nativism

NPS 2004 Control

Model 1 Model 2
1.00
1.06

Model 3
1.02

Model 4
1.04

Model 5
1.03

Model 6
1.01

***

1.62 **

1.48 *

1.27

1.76

2.19

***

2.07 ***

1.82 **

1.18

1.71

4.19

***

2.42 ***

1.89 **

0.71

0.94

8.01

Under 30 years of age

0.58 ***

0.58 ***

0.58 ***

0.59 ***

0.58 ***

Between 30 to 50

0.98

0.99

1.00

1.00

0.98

Low Income

0.93

0.93

0.93

0.93

0.94

South (1=yes)

1.12

1.12

1.10

1.09

1.11

West (1=yes)

1.25

1.23

1.27 *

1.27 *

1.28 *

High School Dropout

0.59 ***

0.59 ***

0.62 ***

College Graduate

0.71 ***

0.73 ***

0.75 **

0.73 **

0.72 **

Conservative (1=yes)

1.41 *

1.43 **

1.39 **

1.37 **

1.38 **

Parent US Born (1=yes)

1.39 *

1.38 *

1.41 *

1.42 *

1.41 *

Women (1=yes)

1.20 **

1.20 *

1.21 *

1.22 **

1.21 **

Racial Stratification Belief

1.30 ***

1.29 ***

1.29 ***

1.28 ***

1.30 ***

Immigrants Take Jobs

2.48 ***

1.06

2.35 ***

2.43 ***

2.45 ***

Outgroup Job Threat

1.12 *

1.12 *

0.85

1.11 *

1.12 *

Out Group Political Threat

1.07

1.06

1.06

0.92

1.06

Out group Closeness

0.83 ***

0.84 **

0.31 **

0.84 ***

1.06

US-Born Hispanic

2.12

Black

3.39

White

3.37

.60 ***

0.60 ***
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US-Born Hispanic*Take Jobs

2.09 *

Black* Take Jobs

2.37 **

White * Take Jobs

3.38 **

US-Born Hispanic*Job Threat

1.10

Black*Job Threat

1.32

White*Job Threat

1.96

US-Born Hispanic*Political Threat

*
***

.95

Black*Political Threat

1.08

White* Political Threat

1.68

***

US-Born Hispanic*Outgroup
Closeness

.88

Black*Outgroup Closeness

.76

White *Outgroup Closeness

.63 **

AIC

5559.05

5228.86

5218.63

5198.67

5203.85

5203.57

Main Effects Models
Table 2.3 presents odds ratios from a series of cumulative logistic regression models
designed to test this study’s hypotheses. A control variable for the 2004 NPS is included in each
model to ensure that the results derived from the analyses are independent of the year from which
the survey was taken. In each model, this control variable is not significant, meaning that
immigration attitudes do not vary by survey year. Model 1 enters the dummies for race/nativity
alone, this model demonstrates that each group, whites (Odds Ratio (OR) = 3.37; p<.001), Blacks
(OR=3.39; p<.001), and US-born Hispanics (OR=2.12; p<.001), are more likely than foreign-born
Hispanics to endorse the nativist belief that immigration should be decreased from its current
levels. Moreover, this model shows that there is no difference in the immigration attitudes of black
and white Americans.
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Model 2 adds demographic control variables. Individuals under the age of 30 display less
opposition to immigration than those over 50 (OR=.58, p<.001). Both variables indexing
educational attainment have significant effects on nativism. Contrary to our expectations,
respondents who did not graduate from high school (OR=.59, p<.01) and those who obtained
college degrees (OR= .71, p<.001) display lower levels of opposition to immigration compared to
respondents who obtained high school diplomas. Political conservatives (OR =1.410, p<.01)
display higher levels of opposition compared to their more liberal counterparts, as do women
(OR=1.20, p<.01) and those whose parents were born in the US (OR=1.39, p<.01). Finally,
individuals who believe that racial minorities should blame themselves for their lower social
standing are more opposed to immigration (OR=1.391, p<.001).
Model 2 also adds the main effects of the moderating variables. Three of the four
moderators have significant main effects in the whole sample. Individuals who agree that
immigrants take jobs (OR=2.48, p<.001) have more nativist feelings, as do individuals who
perceive a greater general outgroup economic threat (OR=1.12, p<.05). Individuals who view
themselves as closer to racial outgroups are more opposed to immigration (OR=.83, p<.001).
Outgroup political threat measure does not have a significant effect on immigration attitudes in
Model 2. The inclusion of additional variables in Model 2 reduces the odds of opposing
immigration slightly for each race/nativity group; however, each group is still more likely to do so
than immigrant Hispanics. The interaction effects models that ensue are designed to determine if
the factors that shape immigration attitudes vary by race and nativity.
Figure 2.1: Nativism by Immigrant Economic Threat
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Models 3-6 present multiplicative effects between the four moderators and the race/nativity
dummy variables. Model 3 adds interaction terms between race/nativity and self-interest. Model
three shows that the interaction effect for each race/nativity group is significant, indicating that
self-interest increases opposition to immigration among these groups more than does among
immigrant Hispanics. Figure 2.1 shows this effect graphically by displaying the probability of
believing that immigration should be decreased by race/nativity and self-interest. Figure 2.1 shows
that among blacks, whites and US Born Hispanics, opposition to immigration is substantially lower
among those who do not believe that immigrants pose an economic threat to native-born
Americans compared to those who believe that immigrants pose an economic threat. However,
among immigrant Hispanics, there is little difference based on self-interest. These findings indicate
that the effect of self-interest on shaping nativism is not observed only among white Americans;
instead, self-interest increases nativist tendencies among all native-born Americans.
Figure 2.2: Nativism by Outgroup Economic Threat and Race/Nationality
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Model 4 presents the interactions with general outgroup economic threat. In Model 4, we
find a significant interaction effect between the economic threat measures and the dummy
variables indexing both black and white respondents. This pattern suggests that the effect of
general economic threat on immigration attitudes is most pronounced among black and white
respondents. Figure 2.2 shows this pattern graphically. Figure 2.2 shows that among those with
low levels of outgroup economic threat (-1 standard deviation) there are relatively small
differences in immigration attitudes among the race/nativity groups. However, as perceptions of
economic threat increase, there is a marked increase in opposition among white and to some degree
black respondents. The resulting pattern is that among those with higher levels of outgroup
economic threat (+1 SD) there is substantial variation immigration attitudes.
Figure 2.3: Nativism by Outgroup Political Threat and Race/Nationality
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Model 5 includes interactions between the race nativity dummy variables and the measure
of outgroup political threat. Model 5 indicates that the effect of outgroup political threat is far more
pronounced among white respondents compared to the other three groups. This interaction is
presented graphically in Figure 2.3. As Figure 2.3 shows, there is virtually no association between
outgroup political threat and immigration attitudes among US Born Hispanic, Black, or immigrant
Hispanic respondents. However, among white respondents, there is a 17% great chance of
endorsing nativist beliefs among those high on outgroup political threat compared to those who
are low on outgroup political threat.

Figure 2.4: Nativism by Outgroup Closeness and Race/Nationality
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The final model includes interaction terms between the race/nativity groups and outgroups
closeness. Similar to Model 5, the results indicate that the negative effect of outgroup closeness
on immigration attitudes is primarily observed for white respondents. Figure 2.4 shows this pattern
graphically. As Figure 2.4 shows, among those with low levels of outgroup closeness, whites
display the highest level of opposition to immigration compared to the other three race/nativity
groups. As outgroup closeness increases, whites’ opposition declines more rapidly than opposition
of the other groups. The result is that among those with higher levels of outgroup closeness, there
are few racial differences in attitudes towards immigration.
In the models above we use the outgroup closeness as a measure of racial attitudes. To
determine the robustness of this pattern, we also estimated models (not shown) that included an
interaction between the racial stratification belief and the race/nativity groups. The results from
this model were substantively consistent with the results from model 6. Namely, the results
indicated that the positive effect of racial stratification beliefs (indicating the belief that minorities
are to blame for their lower standing) was primarily observed among white respondents. This
pattern adds further evidence for the pattern that the immigration attitudes of white are animated
by a desired to maintain economic and political control, as well as negative feelings towards racial
minorities.
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DISCUSSION
This study adds several new findings to current understandings of immigration policy
attitudes and the applicability of the group positions model across racial and nativity groups. By
examining the correlates of immigration attitudes across four race/nativity groups, we show
important similarities and differences in the predictors of immigration attitudes among whites,
Blacks, US-born and foreign-born Hispanics. Specifically, we show that while the immigration
attitudes of whites are animated by a variety of factors, the attitudes of US born Hispanics and
black Americans are mainly linked to their own economic self-interest, rather than group-based
views of out-group economic and political threat.
Self-interest was a predictor of immigration attitudes among all of the US born racial
groups. This finding indicated that when individuals perceive that immigrants pose a direct threat
to their economic self-interest; they subsequently favor reducing immigration into the US. These
findings suggest that the standard argument posited by prominent political figures that immigrants
are a threat to US-born workers may be effective across racial and nativity lines. Moreover, this
pattern adds further evidence that subjective self-interest is a more important factor in shaping
policy attitudes than objective self-interest as measured by socio-economic as individuals’
perceptions about the specter of immigrant threat outweigh the reality of this threat. This
interpretation is further buttressed by the pattern of no association between income and
immigration attitudes and a counter-intuitive pattern of college graduates evincing great opposition
to immigration than those with a high school degree alone. This pattern indicating the power of
subjective perceptions of individual threat underscores the important role that political and media
framing of the immigration issue can have on individuals’ attitudes regarding immigration policy
(Brown 2016; Abascal 2015; Craig and Richeson 2018).

38

In contrast to self-interest, the racial groups examined in this study displayed differences
in how group-based threat measures shaped immigration policy attitudes. Whites were the only
group shown to display significantly higher opposition to immigration when adhering to both
economic and political out-group competition. Although Blacks were also found to be slightly
more likely to display nativism tendencies if they perceived an economic threat from out-groups,
this difference was modest relative to the way that both economic and political outgroup threat
shaped the attitudes of white Americans. Consistent with Abascal (2015), we believe that these
findings suggest that the group positions model is mainly applicable to whites. Specifically, we
argue that these patterns indicate that whites uniquely attempt to preserve their privileged group
position at the top of the racial hierarchy in the US. In some ways, the obdurate hegemonic hold
on economic and political power that whites enjoy also appears to make them more sensitive to
economic and political threats from racial outgroups.
One irony here is that while discussion of “identity politics” are often code words for racial
minorities, it is whites who seemingly have the most stake in retaining a group based hold on
economic and political power in the US and are the most sensitive to group based threats to their
economic and political power (Lipsitz 2006). The totality of the effects of self-interest, groupbased economic and political threat, and racial affect among whites can also explain how the
nativist identity politics of the Trump campaign gained such traction among whites; the
demonization of immigrants activated several mechanisms that increase white nativism. These
effects were most evident in Trump winning among non-college educated whites by nearly 40%
(Pew 2018).
As noted, Black’s tendencies to oppose immigration were also somewhat related to
perceptions of heightened economic vulnerability brought about by out-group competition with
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other racialized out-groups. The critical difference for us, however, between Blacks and whites is
that whites occupy a position of power in comparison to other racial groups while Blacks rank at
or near the bottom in nearly every socioeconomic indicator. Thus, while white’s inclination
towards nativism when they feel threatened by out-groups may reflect an attempt to maintain a
group based racial hierarchy, whereas Blacks’ tendency towards nativism may reflect an attempt
to preserve their personal, but not group based self-interest. Other researchers have interpreted
these types of patterns among Blacks as a shift towards conservatism (Richeson 2018; Abascal
2015), but we see them as strategies deployed by two marginalized groups (i.e., Blacks and USborn Hispanics) to protect certain material benefits of citizenship that their groups still mainly
struggle to attain.
Further, this study contributes to by uncovering patterns among Hispanics. Popular media
and social scientific research seem to have assumed that commonality exists among Hispanic
individuals which override other sociological factors and leads them to mostly prefer policies like
increased immigration as a shared interest among their group. Our research suggests that within
the Hispanic community, there is a divide in public opinion regarding immigration policy between
those born in the United States and those from foreign lands. This variance is related to the
perception held by US-born Hispanics that those born outside the US are an out-group that
threatens their personal economic well-being.
We encountered several limitations while conducting this study. This NPS dataset contains
data from the years 2004 and 2008. While we would have preferred more recent data, the patterns
found in the study provide valuable insight into the social psychological calculations involved in
the policy preferences of individual Americans. We believe these patterns may have only gotten
more robust with the passing of the years due to the increasing political tension surrounding
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immigration policy and popular rhetoric concerning immigrants' threat to the economic well-being
of the average American worker. Another limitation of the study was the low sample sizes of
foreign-born Blacks and whites that led us to exclude them from the study. If sample sizes permit,
future studies should consider testing the ideas proposed in this research with foreign Blacks and
whites included. This decision would enable us to learn if the concept of immigrants as an outgroup only applies when individuals think of Hispanic immigrants.
Lastly, the study does not account for the irrational aspects of racial bias that often motivate
antipathy towards different groups. Sociological studies have long demonstrated that some conflict
between groups is not rooted in a material reality but in illogical fears or desires. These factors are
difficult to capture while using a quantitative survey methodology. It would be difficult for
quantitative scholars to know what questions to ask to measure these phenomena and even still,
those questions would likely require detailed responses not suitable for research of this type. While
measurement of such phenomena was not the goal of this study, it is necessary to mention this as
a limitation of the research.
3. CHAPTER: CAN’T HAVE IDENTITY POLITICS WITHOUT POLITICS:
USING PERCEPTIONS OF NECESSARY POLITICAL ACTIONS TO PREDICT
COMMONALITY AMONG LATINX AMERICANS
The prospects for a large-scale multiracial coalition between racial ethnic minority groups
seems more likely in current times than ever before in the United States (US). Due to the constant
influx of migrants from nations across the world, the US projects to be a majority-minority country
by the year 2050 (Frey 2018). Despite these gains, racial ethnic minority groups such as African
Americans and Latinx Americans still earn far less income, have less wealth, and own homes at
much lower rates than white Americans (Pew Research Center 2013). Consequently, these groups
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are incarcerated at disproportionate rates in comparison to whites and experience the marginalizing
weight of over policing in every aspect of their lives (Alexander 2010; Rios 2011). Asian
Americans, while better off materially than Blacks and Latinx Americans, are also
underrepresented in various social spheres of American politics and entertainment, and their
“model minority” status often obfuscates their unique experiences with racial ethnic discrimination
(Wu 2002; Zhou 2004; Okihiro 1994). Thus, there is much to be gained through a large-scale
political alliance between the three groups.
Much of the research in social psychology that seeks to measure the potential for such
alliances relies heavily on perceptions of discrimination (Craig and Richeson 2012; Richeson and
Craig 2011), in-group commonality (Sanchez 2008; Kaufmann 2003) or linked fate measures
(Hurwitz et al. 2015; Correa 2011) as possible predictors for commonality between African
Americans and Latinx Americans, without placing much emphasis on measures that investigate
individual’s openness to different political tactics as possible predictors for such coalitions. Asian
Americans, in some of these studies, are treated as whites and consequently, efforts to measure
commonality between them and the other racial ethnic minority groups most represented in the US
are not taken up. For commonality between racial ethnic minorities to be viewed as a building
block to interracial coalitions as some studies suggest (Kaufmann 2003), predictors that imply that
individuals adhere more strongly to a politics that attempts to challenge structures of power must
be taken into account. Scholars and media members predicting more racial equality driven by
demographic change make the case that this change will lead to an increase of progressive “identity
politics”—the idea that oppression on the basis of identity, whatever that identity may be, will be
“a source of political radicalization” (Taylor 2017: 8). However, scholarship investigating
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demographic changes and possible interracial coalitions coming from them have not always
recognized that you cannot have an identity politics without politics.
Furthermore, any successful interracial alliance would likely need to include more than just
Blacks and Latinx Americans as their numbers alone will not constitute a sizable enough
electorate, and possibly not even substantial enough numbers in protest, to radically transform the
US into a more ethnically equitable society. This chapter seeks to answer three central questions:
(1) Do constructs measuring individual’s openness to different political tactics, both traditional
and radical forms, improve the prospects for Latinx affinity for racial ethnic minorities? (2) Do the
relationships between these constructs and affinity with other racial groups differ based on the
group they are referencing (i.e. whites, Blacks, or Asians)? And (3), Do these measures of openness
to different tactics among Latinx Americans moderate the effects of perceived discrimination on
perceptions of interracial commonality?
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW
The theoretical premise that guides this work is the understanding that experiences with
racial discrimination do not alone motivate perceptions of commonality between oppressed
groups. Evidence from historical works suggest that alliances between marginalized groups are
formed when groups have experienced similar forms of oppression and were of a political
disposition that something radical needed to be done about it. In the past, doing something about
it has meant engaging methods beyond, but not excluding, electoral politics. Traditional social
movements like those involving the Southern Christian Leadership Conference of Martin Luther
King Jr. (Morris 1986; King Jr. 2010) and the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (Ture
and Hamilton 1992), relied on methods that included voting, protesting, taking issues to court, and
lobbying government officials for policy changes. More radical organizations like those led by
Malcolm X (Myers 1993) and Robert F. Williams (2013) advocated more extreme political
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methods that did not exclude violence. Both types of efforts were able to draw support from other
racial-ethnic groups who had experienced racial discrimination.
Even present-day efforts such as the 2015 Ferguson protests after the shooting of a young
African American male by police, drew interracial political support from Palestinian onlookers
(Hill 2016; Davis 2016). This support was given not only because Palestinians had experienced
similar state-sanctioned racism, but also because they engaged political struggle in ways similar
to the protesters. Watching from Palestine, they tweeted helpful tips to make gas masks to protect
from tear gas deployed by police to break up protests (Hill 2016; Davis 2016). This example
suggests that similar experiences with discrimination bolstered by a worldview that sees society
as flawed but changeable through political means can be a bridge to interracial collaboration.
I use quantitative evidence to argue that efforts to bring together the most politically
engaged segments of aggrieved minority populations is essential to efforts to build viable
interracial coalitions that could challenge current racial hierarchies that position minorities at the
bottom. By politically engaged, I refer here specifically to Latinx Americans who adhere to an
array of traditional political tactics (e.g. voting, protest, lobbying public officials, professing
grievances in court etc.) to produce change on one hand and those who support the most radical
political strategy of violence to produce change, on the other hand. I argue that this construct
strengthens the positive association that perceptions of discrimination can have with commonality
between minorities like Latinx Americans and Blacks, which could help build future coalitions to
struggle against racial inequality.
Theories Emphasizing Perceived Discrimination
Several studies emphasizing the effects of perceived discrimination on intergroup relations
have underscored social identity theory (SIT) and common in-group identity theory (CIIT) as
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useful frameworks for understanding the shifts in racial minorities’ opinions towards other
minority groups amidst changing national demographics (Richeson and Craig 2011). SIT posits
that individuals derive self-esteem from group memberships and attempt to enhance their esteem
by perceiving their own group (the ingroup) more positively than outgroups (Tajfel and Turner
1979; Branscombe et al. 1999). In this sense, common experiences of racial discrimination, for
example, will lead marginalized groups to attempt to make themselves appear more favorable to
dominant groups (i.e. whites) by rejecting other outgroups.
Contrarily, Richeson and Craig (2011) write that “the Common In-group Identity Model
(CIIM) asserts that categorizing oneself and outgroup members in terms of a common,
superordinate identity leads to more positive attitudes toward outgroup members than when
individuals think of themselves as members of distinct group (167).” The social identity threat
model hypothesizes that, for minorities, knowledge of discrimination against one’s in-group will
incite motivations to make one’s group identity more favorable and thus will lead to rejection or
derogation of other outgroups. The common in-group identity model, however, argues that
minorities may develop dual identities when faced with discrimination against their group that may
trigger a common identity with other outgroups (Richeson and Craig 2011; Craig and Richeson
2012).
Whatever theoretical framework is applied, the significant relationship between perceived
discrimination for racial ethnic minorities and attitudes towards other outgroups is undeniable. In
some research offering support for SIT, knowledge of an increasing presence of Hispanics has
resulted in African Americans developing a more nationalist identity that coincides with more
identification with white Americans (Abascal 2015), a shift towards conservatism (Craig and
Richeson 2018), and rejection of immigration (Nteta 2014). Other studies supporting CIIM have
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highlighted the positive effects of perceived discrimination in non-zero-sum contexts (Hurwitz et
al. 2014; Craig and Richeson 2012). Hurwitz and his colleagues (2015) found that Blacks’ and
Latinx Americans’ perceptions of discrimination are positively correlated with linked fate, or the
perception that the experiences of others is bound together with one’s own life chances (Dawson
1994), between the groups and perceptions that the criminal justice system is unfair towards the
opposite group4. Jones-Correa (2011) found similar results as linked fate was positively associated
not only with Latinx commonality with Blacks, but also greater competition.
Perceived discrimination has also been found to differ in its effects by the type and the site
of the acts. For example, Craig and Richeson (2012) find that perceptions of discrimination that
one personally experienced produces a stronger effect on perceptions of other groups than
perceptions of discrimination towards one’s group. Moreover, research on sites of discrimination
find that settings of discrimination in certain public spaces where racial minorities expect to be
protected by law, trigger a cognitive triangulation that links acts directed towards the person in the
present to acts directed at the individual’s group in the past (Feagin 1991). Perceptions of
discrimination are complex and may not necessarily translate to more positive outlooks of similarly
positioned groups.
The aforementioned research offers invaluable information and insight to the field of social
psychology and those interested in intergroup relations. However, a limitation of that work is that
much of the research often discusses political attitudes in passing; typically something to be
accounted for by using traditional measures of political party or political ideology measured by
scales of conservatism and liberalism (see Wallsten and Nteta 2011 and Knoll et al. 2011 for some
research to the contrary). This fact belies the implicit political nature of the category of race itself.

4

Latinx Americans perceptions of discrimination were positively associated with perceptions of unfairness in the
criminal justice system towards Blacks and vice versa (Hurwitz et al. 2014).
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The current study follows the work of Kaufmann (2003) in that it approaches commonality
between minority groups as a basis for further political collaboration between the groups. So, while
factors such as perceived discrimination may predict commonality, this commonality may not
necessarily be the type that motivates future political cooperation. A bevy of evidence exists that
demonstrates the importance of political engagement among racial ethnic minorities in coalition
building and interracial political mobilization.
Alliances formed through Politics
Interracial coalitions throughout history have been sites where innovative and radical
political alternatives have developed (Dawson 2013; Mantler 2013; Ortiz 2018). Much of this
development of innovative or radical alternatives has been by necessity since dominant white
groups have largely outnumbered racial ethnic minority groups, even when those groups are
summed together. By virtue of mathematics, voting will not alone lead to minority victories since
they would not possess enough electoral power to achieve a majority. This kind of thinking
motivated the formation of coalitions between groups who possessed an analysis that recognized
the importance of political structures in producing and reproducing their similar marginalized
positions (Mantler 2013; Bloom and Martin 2013; Foley 2010). Interracial movements such as
second wave feminist efforts in the 1980s (Taylor 2017), Black power endeavors in the 60s and
70s (Bloom and Martin 2013), and civil rights efforts in the 50s and 60s (Mantler 2013) all provide
evidence of groups who began to work together not only because of their common experiences
with oppression but also due to a basic agreement that their struggle was political and necessitated
specific tactics to transform the way government works for marginalized groups.
Some of these tactics were exemplified by the Southern Christian Leadership Conference
(SCLC) who, before Martin Luther King Jr.’s death in 1968, organized groups from multiple racial
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ethnic and gendered backgrounds for the Poor People’s Campaign (Mantler 2013). These groups
utilized a collection of political strategies to enact change that including voting, lobbying the
President of the United States, boycotts, sit-ins, and marches (Morris 1986). The efforts of African
American political movements striking for freedom readily gained the attention of important
Latinx political figures such as Reies Tijerina and Cesar Chavez (Mantler 2013). Both figures,
among many other Latin American activists, sought to build alliances with similarly motivated
Black activist groups. While racism or discrimination was a phenomenon that impacted more
people than those who participated in these coalitions, the readiness to connect those experiences
with political mobilization efforts is what brought those who did participate together. Thus,
political engagement combined with an identity that was connected to oppressive treatment from
the state and dominant groups (e.g. whites) seemed to be the locus of endeavors for interracial
cooperation.
Kwame Ture (formerly Stokely Carmichael) and Charles V. Hamilton (1992) argued that
conscience-based alliances, or those formed because a more privileged group feels sympathy for
a disadvantaged group, always break down when the privileged group’s interest is threatened (Ture
and Hamilton 1992). They identified failures to build sustainable political alliances with liberal
whites in Mississippi, the Black Belt of the South, and in Tuskegee as evidence for their claims.
In Mississippi for example, Blacks supported an innovative political strategy of creating their own
party, the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party (MFDP), and being seated as delegates
independent of the mainstream Democratic party. This innovative strategy placed them at odds
with liberal whites whom they had previously allied with. These whites did not support the strategy
of moving beyond conventional electoral politics by splitting from the mainstream Democratic
party.
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Blacks again attempted to align with whites in Tuskegee by assuming a “politics of
deference”5 that long worked well until Blacks gained a significant portion of economic strength
and attempted to parlay this strength into political power (Ture and Hamilton 1992: 124). When
Blacks attempted to gain significant political power, the county rewrote the Constitution and made
complicated literacy tests the standard citizens had to meet in order to vote. In both instances,
Mississippi and Tuskegee, the coalitions may have enjoyed more success if whites were more
politically engaged partners that relied on multiple tactics in addition to conventional electoral
politics to reach common goals. In doing so, they may have realized how pervasive the
discrimination was and that more political effort was necessary for substantive change. It would
have also showed Blacks that they were dependable partners willing to sacrifice some of their
group interests as whites for racial equality. However, whites’ privileged position in society acted
as an incentive against more politically innovative practices.
Ture and Hamilton argued that “the major mistake made by exponents of the coalition
theory is that they advocate alliances with groups which have never had as their central goal the
necessarily total revamping of the society (Ture and Hamilton 1992: 60 – 61).” Thus, the best
coalition partners would be those groups who have the most to gain from a restructuring of political
structures and those committed to radical political methods and ends to achieve these goals.
Although Ture and Hamilton viewed any alliance or aligning of interests between Blacks and
whites as short-lived and doomed to fail due to whites’ refusal to concede privileges that skin color
offers them; they did not offer much analysis on the potential for Black cooperation with other
disadvantaged racial groups despite multiple examples of such endeavors throughout history.
Evidence exists of Blacks and Mexican Americans working together for fair employment practices

5

Ture and Hamilton borrow this term from Dr. Paul L. Puryear. This sort of politics relinquishes the responsibility of
governing to white civil society while Blacks focus on their own material stability.
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in Texas during the 1940s, Black and Mexican American lawyers working together to dismantle
segregation in public schools during the late 40s and early 50s (Foley 2010), and Blacks and Latinx
American groups joining together in Washington D.C. to march for jobs in the 1960s (Mantler
2013). These instances of togetherness as well as other examples were typically motivated by the
realization that both groups faced similar obstacles to achieving self-determination and equality.
Ture and Hamilton (1992) admitted that even the innovative political strategies that they
supported in their book would only achieve reforms and more drastic political tactics may be
needed to achieve substantive change for Blacks. During the late 1960s, continued disadvantage
for racial ethnic minorities despite the legislative successes of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the 1965
Voting Rights Act, and other bills to promote racial equality, made the political philosophy of
figures such as Malcolm X and Robert F. Williams more popular among minorities (Bloom and
Martin 2013). These philosophies promoted substantive change by any means necessary; the
means being not excluding violent alternatives (Williams 2013; Ball and Burroughs 2012). The
Black Panthers, motivated by thinkers like Williams and X, achieved some success building
interracial coalitions, largely due to their militant stance in combatting inequality (Bloom and
Martin 2013). Popular leaders who advocated radical tactics that included violent self-defense such
as Huey Newton, Eldridge Cleaver, and Fred Hampton garnered broad support from militant
whites, Latinx Americans, and other groups. Bloom and Martin describe a rally held by the Black
Panthers thusly:
The crowd gathered in the hot sun and under the cool shade of the park’s oaks to listen to the speakers and
show their support for Huey Newton. Although Hutton Park lies in the heart of Black west Oakland, more
than half the people who turned out that day were whites, Latinos, and Asian Americans. The crowd was a
rich tapestry of the times and vividly represented the diverse allies that increasingly supported the Black
Panther Party (125).

This ability for a radical organization to build alliances across racial lines should not be
viewed as historically unique. Racialization and its negative consequences have consistently linked
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the fates of groups such as Mexican Americans and African Americans throughout history.
(Gomez 2018). Gomez argues (2016; 2018) that the one drop rule for Blacks and the reverse one
drop rule for Mexicans6 has shaped relations between the groups, both positive and negative. On
a positive note, the marginalization and dispossession of Mexican American rights, which is
likened to the treatment of Blacks, has at times sparked political resistance and short-term alliances
with African Americans and, to some extent, Indigenous Americans. On a more negative note, the
configurations of racial formation have, at other times, isolated these groups from one another and
led to a tempering of political radicalism in favor of more moderate approaches.
Dawson (2013) credits the isolation of the most radical segment of the Black left is a
primary reason behind the weakening of multiracial alliances up until present day. In his work, he
demonstrates that some of the most radical Black thinkers such as W.E.B. Du Bois, Claudia Jones,
Paul Robeson, and William L. Patterson were responsible to connecting Black movements to
struggles of other marginalized groups inside and outside of the United States. He traces the
narrowing of the Black freedom movement from a broad struggle that incorporated the struggles
of a multitude of groups to concerns with issues directly affecting Blacks, and hence limited in its
scope, to the isolation of these figures and other Black proponents of militancy via the draconian
practices occurring during the McCarthyism era that saw US citizens like Du Bois and Robeson
and longtime migrants like Jones ousted from the country and marginalized (Ibid.).

6

The one drop rule refers to the rules of hypodescent for US Americans of African descent. Any trace of African
blood in one’s lineage is used to categorize an individual as African American (see Omi and Winant 2015). The
reverse one drop rule for Mexican Americans, and many other Latin Americans, holds that any trace of Spanish
blood makes an individual white. Gomez (2016; 2018) asserts that the reverse one-drop rule both confers
privileges and disadvantages for Mexican Americans as they are viewed as being above both Blacks and Indigenous
folk, but below whites who have not mixed with American Indians. Any benefits accrued by this status are
marginal.
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It seems clear from this literature and other work, that groups’ political imagination is vital
for any attempts at coalition building. Much of the work reviewed here derives from case studies
of which scholars should take care not to generalize about larger populations. This study uses
quantitative techniques to place these patterns of multiracial alliances under greater empirical
scrutiny in an attempt to provide generalizable insight about factors that improve the prospects for
commonality among groups marginalized due to racial ethnicity. This current study looks to
measure the extent to which engagement with politics among US-born Latinx Americans predicts
commonality with racial ethnic minorities like Blacks and Asians in comparison to the dominant
in-group (i.e. whites). The vast major of research investigating commonality between racial ethnic
minorities studies Blacks and Latinx Americans primarily. This research implicitly removes racial
minority status from Asian Americans and inherently treats them as whites despite the misleading
nature of endorsing such a position (Zhou 1999; Wu 2002). While there are socioeconomic
indicators that would assuredly place Asian Americans closer to whites than they are to Blacks
and Latinx Americans7, this material success obscures the political efforts of Asians to achieve
equality in the US. Common understandings of Asian American success emphasizes their eschewal
of identity politics in lieu of a studious approach to academics and immersion into hard work
despite examples of political endeavors to end school segregation (Okihiro 1994) and to participate
in interracial coalitions to elect racially progressive officials in central cities (Saito 2001; Saito and
Park 2002). Thus, this study measures not only perceptions concerning Blacks and whites that is
commonplace in social psychological research, but those concerning Asians as well. In doing so,
the study posits several hypotheses:

7

See Pew 2013 for socioeconomic comparisons of income, wealth, and homeownership rates between whites,
Asian Americans, Hispanics, and African Americans. Whites and Asian Americans are comparable in income and
wealth data, Asians fall slightly behind whites in homeownership but above blacks and Hispanic Americans. Blacks
and Hispanic income, wealth, and homeownership rates fall far behind the two other groups.
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H1: Perceived commonality with minorities (i.e. Blacks and Asians) will be more likely as
support of political tactics to produce change increases.
H2: Latinx Americans who support violence as a tactic for change will be more likely to
perceive commonality with minorities than those who do not.
H3: Perceptions of discrimination will improve the probability of Latinx perceived
commonality with minorities.
H4: Perceived discrimination will decrease the likelihood of perceived commonality with
whites.
H5: The association of perceived discrimination measures with perceived commonality
with minorities will be greatest among Latinx Americans who support violence as a
political tactic for change.
DATA AND METHODS
Sample
The current study uses data from the 2012-2013 Latino Second Generation Survey. The
Latino Second Generation Survey is a nationally representative survey of 1,050 US born second
generation Latinx Americans of foreign-born parents (Jones-Correa et al. 2017). The study’s stated
goal was to advance scholarly understandings of political socialization and the effects of
immigration on civic participation. The survey also provides a unique range of variables that
measure political engagement among this group. In the past, US born Hispanics have been found
to perceive more commonality with racial minority groups such as African Americans (Barreto et
al. 2014; Morin et al. 2011; Mindiola et. al 2002), so this particular survey provides a great amount
of latitude for deeper investigation of the factors related to that commonality. A set of poststratification item weights supplied by the principal investigators for the research were applied to
adjust the data to reflect general population data for Latinx Americans. Multiple imputation (M=5)
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was used to account for item-level missing data, yielding a sample size of 1,050 total respondents
for the final multivariate models.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics for all Variables
Variable
Mean/Prop
Political Engagement
Index score of Traditional Tactics
1.75
Political Violence necessary (1=Yes)
31.39%
Perceived Discrimination
Index score of discrimination setting (personal)
.5024
Index score of discrimination setting (public)
.6793
Controls
Female (1=Yes)
48.92%
South (1=Yes)
25.27%
Midwest (1=Yes)
8.12%
Northeast (1=Yes)
13.95%
Democrat (1=Yes)
77.33%
Independent (1=Yes)
3.10%
Aged 25 and Up (1=Yes)
36.78%
College Education, no degree (1=Yes)
44.91%
College Education with degree (1=Yes)
10.05%
Head of Household (1=Yes)
39.96%
Rent home (1=Yes)
49.06%
Household Income scale
10.42
Mexican (1=Yes)
63.79%
English Dominant (1=Yes)
25.54%
Dependents
Some to a lot in common with whites (1=yes)
47.50%
Some to a lot in common with Blacks (1=yes)
67.13%
Some to a lot in common with Asians (1=yes)
47.57%
Source, Latino Second Generation Survey (2012 – 2013)
N= 1050; Imputed data; Pooled from 5 Imputations

SD
1.42
.743
.984
4.26
-

MEASURES
Dependent Variables: Commonality with whites, Blacks, and Asians
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for all analysis variables. Respondents were asked
“How much would you say that Latinos in the US have in common with other social groups?” This
question was asked for whites, African Americans and Asians. Respondents could answer a (1) a
lot in common, (2) some things in common, (3) little in common, or (4) nothing at all in common.
These variables were recoded dichotomously, with a score of 1 equivalent to respondents stating
they had some to a lot in common with the group and 0 meaning that they stated they have little to
nothing in common with the group. Commonality is suggested to be a precursor to coalition
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formation (McClain and Stewart 2010; Morin et al. 2011), so I assume that those who answer that
they have little or no commonality with others will not be likely political partners for other groups.
Following this logic, those who would be potential partners would at least need to perceive that
they have more than just a little in common with others. Because the dependent variable is coded
dichotomously, I use binomial logistic regression to estimate the multivariate models that follow
below. Positive values indicate that the variables improve likelihood for commonality with groups.
Linearity of the continuous variables with respect to each of the dependent variables was
tested using the Box-Tidwell (1962) procedure. A Bonferroni correction was applied using all 22
terms in the model resulting in statistical significance being accepted when p<.0022 (Tabachnick
and Fidell 2014). Based on the results of this assessment, all continuous variables were found to
be linearly related to the logit of the dependent variables. There were 19 cases of standardized
residuals with values greater than 2.5, which were kept in the analyses.
Support of Political Tactics
This study includes several primary independent variables. Perceptions of the methods
individuals believe to be necessary tactics for change are measured using two primary variables,
one that measures support for traditional political tactics and the other for support of extreme or
radical tactics. The first variable is measured by responses to questions asking about what political
behaviors the respondent may think are necessary for change. Respondents were asked several
questions regarding political methods for change. The sequence of questioning went as such:
“What kinds of activity do you think are effective in pushing for political change?” Each question
dealt with a different aspect of political methods including (1) voting, (2) participating in legal
protests such as rallies, (3) taking issues to the courts, and (4) lobbying politicians such as the
President, Congress, the Senate, or local political bodies. Each variable was originally coded
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dichotomously in the sample as “1” for yes and “0” for no. An alpha test was estimated to measure
how well these variables coincided with one another. The test yielded a score of .728, which
suggests that combining these variables is appropriate. An index was created summing the scores
of all these variables so that higher numbers equated to respondents being more willing to support
several political mechanisms for change. In the data tables, this variable is referred to as an index
of traditional tactics. Respondents score for the index variable could range from 0 (not open to any
of these methods) to 4 (open to all of these methods). The average openness to traditional social
movement methods score was 1.75, indicating that the average respondent supports just under 2
of the aforementioned tactics to bring about societal change.
Many of the measures outlined in the first perception of political methods variable
represent more traditional political methods employed in the United States. These measures may
not capture the full depth of political engagement among the most radical segments of society. To
account for this issue, a measure for support of radical methods is employed. Respondents were
asked “Do you think it is ever acceptable to break the law in order to make a political statement,
for example through an illegal protest, by damaging property or putting people's lives at risk?”
They could answer (1) never acceptable, (2) only under exceptional circumstances, (3) this kind
of activity is sometimes legitimate, or (4) don’t know. This variable was recoded dichotomously
with “1” corresponding with respondents answering that this behavior is acceptable under certain
circumstances or this kind of activity is sometimes legitimate and “0” corresponding with
respondents who were either unsure (answered don’t know) or believed that it is never acceptable.
Nearly a third (31.39%) of the sample agreed that violence is sometimes acceptable or legitimate
to make a political statement. This variable and the previous variable taken together measure the
concept of support of political tactics for change.
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Perceived Racial Discrimination
The second set of independent variables measure respondents’ perceived experience with
racial discrimination. Following the research of Craig and Richeson (2012), perceptions of racial
discrimination are measured in two separate manners, one being discrimination that one perceives
in interpersonal settings and the other being discrimination that one perceives as being targeted
towards their group or via societal institutions. For both measures, respondents were asked “Have
you ever been unfairly treated because of your race or ethnicity? If yes, in what context was that?”
Responses were coded as “1” for yes or “0” for no for 7 different locations (read 7 variables). An
index was created of the sum of scores for those who selected “a club or restaurant”, “a store”, or
“some other context” to represent intimate interpersonal experiences with racism. The scale of
possible scores ranged from 0 to 3. Another index was created of the sum of scores for those who
selected “at work”, “at school”, “by the police”, or “in a government office” to represent
experiences with discrimination in institutional spaces. The scale of possible scores ranged from
0 to 4. Both averages for the sample were less than 1 experience (e.g. .5024 and .6793 respectively)
meaning that on average, respondents did not experience much racial ethnic discrimination in
either types of settings.
Control Variables
The study uses several basic control variables in the multivariate statistical models that are
consistent across research of this nature, as well as a couple others. Those variables are age, region,
sex, income and education. The oldest respondent in the LSG is 34 years of age. Age is coded to
compare individuals 25 and up8 to those younger than 25. Region is recoded into four variables to

8

The Bureau of Labor Statistics characterizes the 25 – 34 age range as a prime working age. Unemployment rates
for this category are typically the lowest of any age range. Work status has been found to be a predictor of
commonality between Latinx Americans and Blacks.
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measure individuals from the South, Midwest, and Northeast in comparison to those born in the
West. Sex is recoded to compare females to males. Income is coded as an ordinal variable that
changes in dollar increments as an individual move higher up the scale. Lastly, education is coded
to compare individuals who attended college but did not graduate with a degree and individuals
with a four-year college degree to individuals who never attended college.
In addition to these basic demographic variables, two other variables are used to measure
socioeconomic standing. A variable is used to measure if an individual considers themselves as
the head of their household. These individuals may feel more responsible for assuring their
family’s wellbeing, which may impact how they view themselves in relation to other groups. A
control variable was included to measure if a respondent owns their home or rents it. This variable
is dummy coded with “1” indicating that individuals rent their home. People renting homes may
be more socioeconomically vulnerable, which could factor in in how they position themselves in
relation to other groups.
Lastly, the study includes two variables to measure culture and ethnicity. The first measure
is strong Mexican background. Respondents were asked “In what country was your father born?”
This sequence of question was repeated for mothers with respondents being asked “In what country
was your mother born?” There were twenty-one specific Latin American countries mentioned for
both fathers and mothers. Respondents with both parents originating from Mexico were coded as
having a strong Mexican background. Respondents with parents from other Latin American
countries or only 1 parent from Mexico were coded as not having a strong Mexican background.
Among Latinx Americans, Mexicans are known for strongly working to retain their distinct culture
which at times distances them from groups like Black Americans (Sanchez 2008; Kaufmann
2003). Very few respondents had only one parent from Mexico. The overwhelming majority of
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respondents had two parents that originated from the same country. Sixty-four percent of all
respondents in the study have a strong Mexican background.
The second measure of culture and ethnicity is the respondent’s primary language.
Respondents were asked about their language proficiency. They could respond with (1) English
dominant, (2) bilingual, or (3) Spanish dominant. Language proficiency was dummy coded with
“1” accounting for respondents who said they were English dominant and “0” for respondents who
selected bilingual or Spanish dominant. Past research has demonstrated that language as a measure
of acculturation or assimilation predicts attitude towards other groups among Hispanics (Kaufman
2003). Individuals who speak heavy Spanish in comparison to English are thought to be more
resistant to letting go of important cultural attributes that keep them connected to their home
country and more socially distant from native-born US American groups. Just over a quarter of the
sample (26%) reported as predominant English speakers.
Figure 3.1: Racial Commonality by Acceptance of violence as a political tactic
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RESULTS
Figure 3.1 and table 3.2 presents bivariate results of the distribution of levels of perceptions
of violence as a political tactic across the three dependent variables. Figure 3.1 and table 3.2
demonstrate preliminary support for hypotheses 1 and 2, exhibiting greater levels of commonality
with Blacks and Asians as individuals support of traditional political tactics increases and among
those who support political violence in some circumstances. The correlation between support of
traditional tactics and commonality with racial minorities is weak to moderate (see table 3.2).
Latinx Americans who adhere to radical tactics such as limited violence for political change, are
more about 15 percent more likely to perceive commonality with Blacks and about 11 percent
more likely to perceive Asians than those who do not adhere to this political option (see figure
3.1).
Table 3.2: Zero-order Correlation Coefficients
Variables
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(1)Traditional tactics (index)
.216*** .117*** -.026
.233*** .137***
(2) Discrimination (personal settings)
--.541*** -.075*
.175*** .027
(3) Discrimination (institutional settings) ----.005
.165*** -.004
(4) Commonality with whites
------.186*** .292***
(5) Commonality with Blacks
--------.450***
(6) Commonality with Asians
----------Source: Latino Second Generation Survey (2012 – 2013) Imputed from 5 imputations

Table 3.2 offers preliminary support for hypothesis 3 and partial support for hypothesis 4.
It shows that perceptions of discrimination, whether in personal settings or institutional settings,
improves feelings of commonality with Blacks and Asians (hypothesis 3). More perceptions of
discrimination in personal settings correlate with less commonality with whites, while
discrimination in institutional settings is unrelated to commonality with whites (hypothesis 4).
Among Latinx Americans, more experiences with racism coincide with less commonality with
whites, possibly due to those experiences involving whites. Commonality with any of the groups
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is positively correlated with commonality with all the groups, however, the factors involved in
predicting commonality with individual groups appears to differ. The bivariate analyses provide
support for several of the research hypotheses. The multivariate analyses estimated below allow
for statistical control of multiple demographic variables to measure the unique relationship
between the independent variables tested here and levels of the dependent variables.
Table 3.3: Odds Ratios for Logistic Logit Models Predicting Commonality
White
Commonality
Support of Political Tactics
Traditional Tactics (index)
0.968
Political Violence Necessary
1.249
Perceived Discrimination
Personal setting discrimination
0.724**
Institutional setting discrimination 1.094
Controls
Female
0.798^
South
1.021
Midwest
2.207**
Northeast
0.711
Democrat
1.000
Independent
1.001
Aged 25 and up
0.959
College Educated no degree
1.233
College Educated degree earned
1.066
Income Scale
0.976
Head of Household
2.781***
Rents Home
0.753^
Mexican (1=Yes)
1.084
English Dominant
0.909
Log Likelihood
1366.378
Source: Latino Second Generation Survey (2012 – 2013)
N: 1,050; ^=p<.10; *=p<.05; **=p<.01; ***=p<.001
Imputed Data: Data pooled from 5 imputations

Black Commonality Asian Commonality

1.297***
1.583**

1.114^
1.312^

1.308*
1.283**

1.096
0.915

1.395*
0.840
0.624
0.327^
1.348
1.430
0.736^
0.939
0.918
1.055**
1.211
1.123
0.714
1.713**
1197.404

0.844
0.924
0.872
0.657
1.105
0.705
0.774
0.991
1.092
1.049*
1.593**
1.148
1.021
1.188
1397.962

Commonality with whites
Table 3.3 presents odds ratios from a binomial logistic regression model to test the research
hypotheses of the study. The first column of odds ratios provides the results from the model used
to predict commonality with whites. Variables used to measure support of different political tactics

62

appear to have no effect on Latinx Americans perception of commonality with whites. The
association between experiences with personal discrimination and commonality with whites from
the previous correlation analysis remains even when controlling for several demographic
attributes, offering partial support for hypotheses 4. Other variables that were statistically
significant were residence in the Midwestern region of the US (Odds Ratio (OR)=2.207; p<.01)
and being the head of household (OR=2.781; p<.001). The ratio produced by both variables
suggest that they increase the likelihood that Latinx Americans will perceive commonality with
whites.
Commonality with Blacks
The results from the second column provide results for the model used to predict
commonality with Blacks. Nearly all the independent variables produce statistically significant
changes in the dependent variable. Both variables measuring political engagement and both
variables measuring experiences with racial ethnic discrimination significantly and substantially
increase the likelihood for Latinx American respondents to perceive commonality with African
Americans, supporting my predictions for hypotheses 1 through 3 concerning commonality with
the African American group. The strongest predictor of these variables appears to be tolerance for
radical politics. Latinx Americans who perceive political violence as necessary under certain
circumstances are about 58% (OR= 1.583; p<.01) more likely than their counterparts who do not
hold similar beliefs to perceive commonality with Blacks. Other variables of note for predicting
perceptions of commonality with Blacks were sex (OR=1.395; p<.05), with females more likely
to perceive commonality than males, and income (OR=1.055; p<.01). Respondents displayed
greater levels of commonality with Blacks as they moved up along the income scale. Lastly,
cultural acculturation measured by proficiency with the English language (OR=1.713; p<.01)
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increases the likelihood that Latinx American respondents will perceive commonality with African
Americans.
Commonality with Asians
The third and final model in table 3 displays results for variables predicting commonality
with Asians. Variables measuring support for certain political tactics were just short of statistical
significance at the p<.05 level. Experiences with racism whether in personal settings or in formal
institutional settings were not a factor in predicting commonality with Asians, whereas they were
completely a factor for predicting commonality with Blacks and a partial factor in predicting
commonality with whites. Hypotheses 3 is unsupported when predicting commonality with the
Asian group. Finally, similar to model 1 predicting commonality with whites, the demographic
variable measuring if a respondent considers themselves as the head of household (OR=1.593;
p<.01) increases the probability for perceiving commonality with Asians. This variable appears to
be the strongest predictor of Latinx commonality with both whites and Asians.
Table 3.4: Odds Ratios for Interaction Effects on Commonality with Blacks
Model 1
Model 2
Political Engagement
Traditional tactics (index)
1.416*** 1.299***
Political violence necessary
1.548**
1.462^
Perceived Discrimination
Personal setting discrimination
1.314*
1.312*
Institutional setting discrimination
1.656*** 1.231^
Interactions
Political tactics index*institutional disc 0.861*
Political violence*institutional disc.
1.146
Political tactics index * personal disc.
Political violence * personal disc.
AIC
1191.299 1196.748
Source: Latino Second Generation Survey (2012 – 2013)
N: 1,050; ^=p<.10; *=p<.05; **=p<.01; ***=p<.001
Imputed Data: Data pooled from 5 imputations

Model 3

Model 4

1.365***
1.606***

1.289***
1.243

1.678**
1.267*

1.103
1.299**

0.877^
1194.903

1.856*
1191.663

64

Figure 3.2: Traditional Political Tactics Support and Discrimination in Institutional
Settings
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Figure 3.3: Political Violence Support and Discrimination in Personal Settings
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The interaction results are presented in table 3.4 and figures 3.2 and 3.3. Control variables
were used to predict these models, but they were not shown here to save for space. Table 3.4
displays results for multiplicative effects of the main independent concepts support of different
political tactics and perceived discrimination as moderators for one another across levels of
perceived commonality with Blacks. Multiplicative effects were not produced to predict
commonality with whites and Asians since neither concept proved to be a significant predictor for
Asians and only one measure of a concept proved to be a significant predict for commonality with
whites (discrimination in personal settings). These interaction models help to determine if
associations found using the primary independent variables to predict commonality with Blacks
vary across different levels of one another.
Statistically significant interaction effects are shown in models 1 and 3. Both effects are
between the concepts of political engagement and perceived discrimination, but in opposite
directions. Model 1 demonstrates that support of traditional political tactics for producing change
(i.e. Political tactics index) interacts with perceived racial ethnic discrimination in more formal or
institutional spaces (OR= 0.861; p<.05). Experiences with discrimination in formal institutional
settings decreases the likelihood of perceiving commonality with Blacks among the most
politically engaged Latinx Americans. This finding suggests that the difference in the magnitudes
of the effects of these variables on commonality with African Americans decreases as levels of the
variables simultaneously increase. Contrary to support of political violence, which can be
emboldened by experiences with racial inequality, the traditional political tactics index variable
measures one’s adherence to relatively traditional and legitimate methods for conducting
transformative politics. Negative experiences in these types of more formal settings may
discourage these politically engaged individuals from working with other groups, especially if
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these experiences are produced by members of that group. The findings from this interaction effect
are consistent with the core assumptions of social identity threat.
Model 4 of table 3.4 demonstrates the opposite effect between tolerance for violence for
political goals and experiences with racial discrimination in more personal settings (OR=1.856;
p<.05). The odds ratio for this interaction demonstrates that for those tolerant of politically radical
tactics like violence, experiences with racial discrimination in personal settings increases their
likelihood for perceiving commonality with Blacks by over 85 percent. This finding suggests, that
among those already susceptible to more dramatic outlooks of politics, experience with injustice
or inequality heightens their perceptions of affinity with other marginalized groups, similar to the
core assumptions made within the common in-group identity model. Figure 3.3 shows strong
support for hypothesis 5 as the positive association of perceived discrimination on perceived
commonality with Blacks is displayed to be greatest among those who support violence in some
cases to meet political objectives.
DISCUSSION
The above study adds to current understandings of intergroup relations and commonality
in several ways. First, it suggests that research in social psychology should focus more on the
political sensibilities of racial ethnic minority groups beyond traditional measures of political party
membership or ideology. In social psychology, we tend to discuss, at length, the relationship
between linked fate ideologies or experiences with discrimination with perceptions of
commonality which could lead to intergroup cooperation (see Kaufman 2003; Hurwitz et al. 2014;
Barreto et al. 2014; Morin et al. 2011; Sanchez 2008). We do this without also considering that
race has often been a designation with political implications and consequences. Thus, what is
important in predicting commonality, and potentially cooperation, amongst historically
marginalized groups is not only negative experiences that can be associated with those of another
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group but a willingness to engage structures of power measured by adherence to certain political
mechanisms as possible methods for political agitation.
This study looked at the manner in which political engagement predicts commonality
among Latinx Americans with whites, African Americans, and Asian Americans. I find that the
more political mechanisms for change that one is willing to engage, as well as a willingness to
adhere to radical political methods increases the likelihood that US-born Latinx Americans will
find commonality with Blacks, but not with whites and Asians. In addition, the positive of
association of perceptions of discrimination on commonality with Blacks is moderated by support
of these political tactics. However, in some circumstances that interaction may produce an outlook
more akin to the assumptions made in the common in-group identity model, and in others that
interaction could associate with an outlook more akin to the core assumptions of the social identity
threat model. Among individuals who have experienced discrimination, radical outlooks on
political possibilities associate with greater affinity between groups, consistent with CIIM’s thesis.
Among those same individuals the positive relationship between perceptions of discrimination and
commonality is weakened by greater support of traditional political tactics, consistent with SIT’s
core assumptions.
In identifying political engagement as a predictor for perceived commonality among Latinx
Americans with minorities, this study uncovered a pattern that still deserves further investigation
in the field. Asian Americans are often propped up by society as a model minority and equated
socially to whites because of their educational and financial resources (Zhou 2004; Wu 2002).
Even some research in social psychology has repeated this pattern of equating Asians to whites
(see Hurwitz et al. 2015), which implicitly assumes that the views of more materially
disadvantaged racial ethnic minority groups like Blacks and Latinx Americans will resemble the
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attitudes they hold towards whites. This assumption is made despite insights that suggest that
minorities such as Latinx Americans may have more in common with Asian Americans due to
their history of immigration and their ability to mix more freely with whites than Blacks are
capable of (Lee and Bean 2007). This study produced results that are in some ways consistent with
those assumptions but in other ways contradicts them.
Perceived discrimination or political engagement for Latinx Americans did not improve
the prospects for affinity with Asians. Measures for head of household were important factors for
predicting commonality among Latinx Americans with whites and Asians. This finding possibly
suggests that Latinx Americans view Asians and whites as providers more so than they do for
Blacks, which could be related to negative stereotypes held by the group towards African
Americans (see Mindiola et al. 2002; McClain et al. 2006). Taken together, the results found
among measures of perceived commonality with Asians suggests that Latinx Americans hold a
perception of Asians similar to their perceptions of whites, which is consistent with other research
in this area. This idea would explain why perceived discrimination improves the prospects for
perceiving commonality with Blacks but not with the Asian group.
This study included several limitations of which I will make mention of a few. First, the
sample relies on data exclusively from second generation Latinx Americans. While this group is
an interesting group to observe, it would be invaluable if researchers could analyze if these findings
hold among later generations who have had more time to become acculturated into US American
society. The amount of predominantly English speakers was only a third of the sample, which
proved to be an important measure in the statistical model. A sample including more third and
fourth generation Latinx Americans would produce more English dominant speakers and allow
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researchers to compare the generations and determine if acculturation is as strong of a predictor as
this research and similar studies shows.
Secondly, other racial ethnic groups should be included in similar models to measure if the
importance of political engagement for commonality holds across groups. The core assumption of
work that seeks to measure attitudes concerning intergroup commonality is that it can potentially
measure the likelihood for cooperation between groups. However, likeness does not always equate
to cooperation and political success. Similar findings across groups would suggest that not only
do these groups see similarities between themselves and others, but they are also willing to engage
politics as method for substantive change.
Moreover, the sample used in the study only included individuals from the ages 18 to 34.
Research has demonstrated that younger Latinx Americans view minorities such as Blacks more
favorable in general (Hurwitz et al. 2015), thus this fact may have caused some bias in the results
and affected the generalizability of the findings. The principal investigators did provide post
stratification weights to make the sample more representative, however this act may not have
completely addressed the issue. Future studies would benefit from samples that reflect the
population of interest more closely.
Lastly, on the aforementioned point on the potential of commonality studies, the current
study did not measure commonality as a predictor for policy prescriptions. While it’s important
that groups see similarities between one another if they hope to work together, these similarities
may not equate to support of radically transformative policy positions such as reparations for
slavery (in the case of Blacks) or a borderless society (in the case of individuals who have a long
history of migration such as Latinx or Asian Americans). Future studies should attempt to measure
how these attitudes concerning commonality associate with particular policy preferences. At the
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any rate, the current study is an addition to works that look at the conditions for which groups find
common ground in hopes for the days when they use it to take a stand side by side.
4. CHAPTER: PERCEPTIONS OF MINORTIY DISCRIMINATION, POLITICAL
ACTIVITY, AND POLICY PREFERENCES: USING THE COMMON INGROUP
IDENTITY MODEL TO PREDICT ATTITUDES FOR RACE-BASED POLICY
INITIATIVES
Scholarship that looks to assess factors that may improve the prospects for interracial or
interethnic coalition building between minorities typically focuses on individual’s perceptions of
personal or group-based discrimination as a predictor of affinity for other groups. In many cases,
these researchers find one’s personal or perceived group experiences with racial-ethnic motivated
discrimination to be positively associated with one’s perception of commonality. These
experiences are also associated with linked fate with other historically marginalized groups
(Hurwitz et al. 2015), with personal experiences of discrimination displaying stronger associations
than perceptions of discrimination against one’s group (Craig and Richeson 2012). Thus, the logic
follows that racial-ethnic minorities who have experienced racial-ethnic discrimination are more
likely to be potential political collaborators with members of groups who have similar histories.
While this research has advanced scholarship in social psychology, there are still associated
questions that are left unanswered.
First, in a society where traditional overt forms of racial prejudice or discrimination have
been severely abated over the past sixty years (Bobo et al. 1997; Kinder and Sanders 1996; BonillaSilva 2015), is it a sound strategy to base interracial alliances on whether people have faced
experiences that are more difficult for one to be cognizant of in the post-Civil Rights era? Research
focusing on individual’s acknowledgement of discrimination towards other racial minorities in
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general may uncover patterns that are more workable to base coalitions on than individual’s own
experiences. Those experiences may be more difficult to notice in a post-Civil Rights society that
is far less overtly discriminatory.
Secondly, scholarship purporting that perceptions of discrimination (Kaufmann 2003;
Craig and Richeson 2012), linked fate (Correa 2011; Barreto et al. 2014; Hurwitz et al. 2015), or
factors like internal group consciousness or pan-ethnic identity (Sanchez 2008) have positive
relationships with intergroup affinity tend to make their case using measures of intergroup
commonality as outcome variables. Far less research observes how these concepts predicting
commonality relate to race-based policy preferences. Since public policy acts as a mechanism for
changing an individual’s material condition, work on this front is not only intriguing but necessary
to advance knowledge in the field of social psychology further.
Lastly, there are still questions on how different group’s political disposition figures into
their potential to perceive affinity with minority groups and to work collaboratively with them on
political matters. In chapter 3, I found that individuals more open to political tactics that go beyond
traditional methods (e.g. voting) are more likely to perceive an affinity with racial ethnic
minorities. However, a limitation of that study is that it was restricted to second-generation Latinx
Americans and it did not look at how these patterns related to specific policy preferences. The
opinions of other racial-ethnic minority groups as well as white Americans need to be analyzed in
order to ascertain the potential efficacy of allying with politically liked-minded individuals as a
strategy for interracial coalition building. This chapter seeks to fill the gaps in the literature by
addressing three main questions:
1. Are general perceptions of racial ethnic minority discrimination related to more liberal
preferences for race-based policy?
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2. Is this relationship moderated by an individual’s level of political activity?
3. How do these patterns differ across racial ethnic groups?
What follows is a review of the review of the theoretical framework used for this study and the
relevant literature.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW
This chapter utilizes the common ingroup identity model (CIIM) as a theoretical
framework for building and interpreting the analysis that follows. CIIM is a constellation of ideas
developed by Maureen Craig and Jennifer Richeson through the use of experimental research. The
theory purports that when members of outgroups categorize themselves and members of other
outgroups as having a common superordinate identity, usually one characterized by disadvantage,
they express more positive attitudes towards those groups (Richeson and Craig 2011; Craig and
Richeson 2012; Craig and Richeson 2018). In line with this theory, I argue that identification of
racial minorities with misplaced disadvantage (i.e. discrimination) is associated with more
progressive policy preferences that disproportionately benefit minority groups.
In a study where four separate experiments were conducted, researchers measured Asian
American’s and Latinx American’s feelings of similarity with Blacks, anti-Black attitudes, and
bias towards Black Americans. They found that the experiment group (i.e. those primed with news
articles highlighting discrimination against their group) rated Blacks more positively than those in
the control group (i.e. those who received an article related to something else). Asian Americans
and Latinx Americans primed with articles highlighting discrimination against their group also
reported higher ratings of similarity to Blacks. Lastly, for members of both groups, perceived
similarity with Blacks mediated the effect of perceived discrimination on automatic attitudes such
as outgroup affinity. Said differently, perceptions of discrimination imbue a feeling of closeness
with Blacks which is then correlated with more positive ratings of African Americans. This finding
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demonstrates that commonality may be an avenue to more positive perceptions and relations
between groups (Craig and Richeson 2012). These experiments suggest that perceptions of racial
discrimination, in some cases, lead to the development of a common disadvantaged identity among
minorities that promotes commonality or coalition potential between groups.
Other studies demonstrate that linked fate, or the perception that the experiences of others
is bound together with one’s own life chances (Dawson 1994), is associated with perceptions of
commonality9 between minorities (Hurwitz et al. 2015; Barreto et al. 2014; Morin et al. 2011).
Hurwitz and his colleague’s (2015) research show that when groups are not positioned against one
another in a zero-sum context, perceptions of experience with racism lead to greater affinity with
other racial ethnic groups. They find support among Black respondents for the linked fate
hypothesis, demonstrating that Blacks who perceive a linked fate with Latinos are more likely to
perceive anti-Black discrimination in the criminal justice system. They find partial support for this
hypothesis among Latinos perceiving anti-Latino discrimination. These patterns are consistent
among Blacks’ perceptions of anti-Latino discrimination and for Latinos perceiving anti-Black
discrimination. For the latter, the effects of linked fate on perceptions of anti-Black discrimination
find more support than was found for anti-Latino discrimination among Latinos. The authors
conclude by arguing that these findings suggest the potential for a multi-racial coalition between
blacks, Latinos, and a minority of whites (Hurwitz et. al 2015).
Hurwitz and his colleagues’ research give more insight into the debate in social psychology
between the Social Identity Threat (SIT) hypothesis and CIIM. In many ways, SIT stands in
contrast to CIIM. Studies emphasizing SIT have demonstrated that perceptions of discrimination

9

Linked fate and commonality are two different concepts, although they possess some similarities. Linked fate is
the assumption that an individual’s fate is tied to another’s. Commonality refers to the belief that groups have
something in common, though they may not view themselves as being bound to others.
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by an outgroup at times tend to be negatively associated with commonality with other outgroups
(Tajfel and Turner 1979; Branscombe 1999). Consequently, several empirical studies in political
science and social psychology have observed conflict between groups with comparable histories
of disadvantage that positively associate with competition between the groups. McClain et al.
(2006) found that migrant Latinx Americans in North Carolina feel closer to whites than they do
to Blacks, despite their similar economic predicaments. This finding may be a result of competition
for scarce resources that is amplified by racial-ethnic discrimination (McClain 1993; Mindiola et
al. 2002; McClain et al. 2006; McClain and Stewart 2010; Nteta 2014; Wilkinson 2014). Using
data from the Latino National Survey (LNS 2006) and the 2006 – 2010 US Census, Wilkinson
(2014) finds that the economic context that Latinx reside in effects their perception of closeness
with Blacks and whites. Latinx residing in poorer areas were more likely to report lesser feelings
of commonality with Blacks and more affinity with whites. These findings reflect SIT’s
predictions that when faced with discrimination due to outgroup status, members of the outgroup
will attempt to make themselves more favorable to the ingroup (i.e. whites) by distancing
themselves from other outgroups. However, in non-zero-sum situations10 (i.e. situations where
there is not a competition for scarce resources), the opposite occurs with outgroups’ perceptions
of discrimination being linked to increased feelings of closeness with other outgroups (Hurwitz et
al. 2015; Craig and Richeson 2012; Craig and Richeson 2018).
Moreover, some studies investigating intergroup commonality and competition have
produced perplexing findings. In many studies of affinity between African Americans and Latinx

10

Non-zero-sum contexts also involve circumstances where each group stands to benefit or lose out similarly. For
example, since both Blacks and Latinx Americans are disproportionately incarcerated, both groups stand to benefit
from criminal justice reform. This example is a situation where neither group may perceive disadvantage if the
other benefits.
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Americans, the social contact hypothesis11 ( Sigelman and Welch 1993) has been confirmed as
these groups report greater levels of commonality with one another as their time around the other
group increases (Jones-Correa 2011; Wilkinson 2014). While other studies have demonstrated that
Blacks and Latinx Americans perceive heightened levels of competition with the other group as
the opposite group’s population increases (Barreto et al. 2013; Abascal 2015), other research
details this competition to be positively correlated with commonality (Jones-Correa 2011). Thus,
findings highlighting associations for measures of competition or commonality between minority
group members may not necessarily suggest that these groups will be more or less likely to
participate in a “rainbow coalition” (Kaufmann 2003) or interracial political practice that seeks to
benefit racial-ethnic minorities. Generally, an approach that may be more intuitive in our
assessment of the potential for interracial coalitions would need to investigate the way measures
of perceptions of discrimination predict policy preferences for ostensibly race-based political
initiatives.
Historically, experiences with racial-ethnic discrimination have been politically useful
when groups use them as motivation to mobilize political endeavors to transform their conditions.
In the Civil Rights era and the era leading up to it, African Americans and Latinx Americans have
identified a commonality in racial oppression and used this likeness to form political unions (Ortiz
2018; Mantler 2015; Foley 2010). Asian Americans have also often played a role in these
interracial alliances in areas such as Los Angeles and New York. Anti-immigrant stances taken by
governments have been a catalyst for Latinx American-Asian American unions in LA (McClain
and Stewart 2010; Lipsitz 2006) while efforts by these groups achieve more diverse political
representation have motivated interracial coalitions by the two in New York (Saito and Park 2000;

11

The social contact hypothesis suggests that increased social interaction with a minority group positively impacts
the likelihood that individuals will view that group in a favorable light (Sigelman and Welch 1993).
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Saito 2001). Asian Americans’ upward mobility and socioeconomic proximity to whites often
obscures their historical and contemporary bouts with racial-ethnic discrimination and their
subsequent struggles to engage structures of power to mitigate the effects of such acts (Okihiro
1994; Wu 2002; Zhou 2004).
While there is historical evidence that experiences with discrimination have emboldened
Asians and other racial-ethnic minority groups to build political coalitions, work investigating this
potential relationship is scant in the field of social psychology. Moreover, in the apparent link
between these experiences, a certain level of political activity, and potential for cooperation with
other racial-ethnic groups, it remains unclear if an individual’s own experience with mistreatment
is a necessary prerequisite. Could a general outlook that recognizes the mistreatment of others
operate as a substitute for one’s personal experiences to predict cooperation? There is some
evidence that this relationship could be the case. Most work emphasizing CIIM as a framework to
understand interracial coalition building uses an individual’s personal experiences with
discrimination to predict commonality with other outgroups (Craig and Richeson 2012; Craig and
Richeson 2018). An important departure from prior research in Hurwitz et al. (2015) study is that
they measured perceptions of discrimination against a group that one does not identify with. In
doing so, they found that these perceptions are associated with perceptions of pessimism towards
the criminal justice system, an institution that has received much criticism for its racial bias. That
said, they have demonstrated that one’s personal experiences with racial ethnic injustice may not
be a prerequisite for intergroup commonality, only a general outlook towards fairness for people
of diverse backgrounds may be required.
Findings such as these can provide a roadmap for future coalition building not only
between Latinx and African Americans who have storied histories with discrimination, but with
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Asians and whites whose experiences of the like have been more minimal in comparison with the
former groups. This suggestion could also mean that more support for progressive political stances
across groups can be achieved even when that stance may not coincide with an immediate
improvement in the life chances of a particular individual. Fairer treatment of non-citizens,
rejection of racial profiling, and acceptance of affirmative action practices are all examples of
policy initiatives that not all racial-ethnic groups may benefit from evenly. Some may even be
modestly negatively affected by such policies. The argument for CIIM as a workable theory for
interracial coalition building could be made stronger if research finds that general perceptions of
discrimination are positively related to more progressive political stances even when that stance
does not ostensibly benefit one’s racial-ethnic group. Considering these thoughts, I propose the
following hypotheses:
1. Acknowledging racial discrimination towards racial-ethnic minorities will be
associated with support for progressive race-based policy initiatives.
2. Increased political activity will be associated with support for progressive race-based
policy initiatives.
3. Acknowledging racial discrimination maintains a stronger relationship with supporting
race-based policies among political activist than among non-activists.
4. Acknowledging racial discrimination maintains a stronger relationship with supporting
race-based policies among racial minorities.
Following are the methods, data, and measures that I use for this analysis.
DATA AND METHODS
Sample
This study utilizes data from the 2008 and 2012 National Politics Study (NPS). It is a
nationally representative survey of non-institutionalized individuals, aged 18 and over. Its aim was
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to compile information on individual’s public opinions, attitudes, and actions regarding
contemporary political issues (Jackson et al. 2008). A strength of the study is that it provides large
samples of racial-ethnic minorities such as African Americans, Latinx Americans, and Asian
Americans. These samples are large enough to provide statistical power for researchers to uncover
significant variances between groups if they indeed exist.
The 2008 NPS was conducted from September 2008 to December of that year. There was
a total of 1,477 respondents which included 519 non-Hispanic whites, 329 non-Hispanic African
Americans, 444 Hispanics, 88 Asian Americans, and 97 Caribbean Blacks. The 2012 version of
the survey had fewer respondents, totaling 430 individuals. Of these 430 respondents, 182 were
non-Hispanic whites, 97 were non-Hispanic African Americans, 53 were Hispanic, 78 were Asian,
1 was a Pacific Islander, and 9 were of another race not listed on the survey. Ten respondents did
not identify as any of the races. Although the data includes various racial-ethnicities, this study
only analyzed the opinions of whites, Blacks, Latinx, and Asian Americans. The datasets were
merged and multiple imputations (M=5) were conducted to account for item-level missing data, to
give a sample size of 1,796 respondents.
Table 4.1: Proportions and Means for Descriptive Variables
Blacks

Whites

Asians

Latinx

Total

Women (1=yes) 64.26%

61.23%

37.35%

57.26%

58.88

College Grad.
(1=yes)
Foreign Born
(1=yes)

32.15%

51.28%

84.46%

20.94%

41.35%

4.55%

6.00%

67.59%

55.06%

25.06%

Republican
(1=yes)

2.54%

26.07%

18.56%

13.22%

16.31%

Democrat
(1=yes)

73.64%

41.73%

36.99%

52.95%

51.81%
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Work full-time
(1=yes)

36.22%

39.03%

61.81%

41.56%

41.11%

Age

7.30
(3.26)

8.01
(3.21)

7.08
(2.88)

5.31
(3.16)

7.00
(3.37)

Self-perceived
discrimination

3.48
(.6577)

2.11
(.9629)

2.75
(.7001)

2.86
(.6747)

-----

Minority
perceived
discrimination
Political
Activity sum

3.04
(.5513)

2.84
(.6157)

3.01
(.6674)

3.27
(.7313)

2.96
(.6072)

.9397
(.9615)

.7939
(.9161)

.6024
(.8448)

.5693
(.8518)

.7457
(.9139)

Total

418

704

166

492

178012

MEASURES
Dependent Variables: Race-Based Policy Attitudes
Three variables are used in this study to measure race-based policy attitudes. The first
variable used relates to racial profiling and reads “Law enforcement should be able to stop or arrest
people of certain racial or ethnic backgrounds if they are thought to be more likely to commit
crimes”. Respondents could select “strongly agree”, “somewhat agree”, “somewhat disagree”, or
“strongly disagree”. The variable is coded such that higher values suggest stronger disagreement
or rejection of the policy initiative.
Next, a variable is used to measure preferences towards detaining undocumented migrants
and reads “The government should be able to imprison a non-citizen as long as they see fit if that
person is suspected of belonging to a terrorist organization”. Respondents could select “strongly
agree”, “somewhat agree”, “somewhat disagree”, or “strongly disagree”. The variable is coded in

12

Descriptive statistics were computed by selecting cases by race and running analyses listwise with other
variables included in the model. For this reason, the total sample size was slightly lower than the 1,796 cases that
were included for the rest of the analyses.
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an order such that a higher value suggests stronger disagreement or rejection of the policy
initiative.
Lastly, respondents were questioned about their preferences for affirmative action policies.
They were asked “How strongly do you favor or oppose preferential hiring and promotion?”
Respondents could select “strongly favor”, “somewhat favor”, “somewhat oppose”, or “strongly
oppose”. The variable is coded such that higher values suggest stronger support of the policy
initiative. All three variables act as a proxy for race-based policy initiatives.
Independent Variables: Perceptions of Discrimination
There are three independent variables that are the focus of this study. The first is an
individual’s general perception of the amount of discrimination that racial-ethnic minorities face.
Respondents were asked “How much discrimination or unfair treatment you think different groups
face in the U.S?” They were asked this question for five different groups: Blacks, whites, Asians,
Hispanics, and Caribbeans. Respondents could answer “a lot”, “some”, “a little”, or “none”. The
variables were reverse-coded so that higher values would reflect stronger perceptions of
discrimination towards groups. For the full multivariate models, the mean was taken of
individual’s responses to discrimination facing the four minority groups (e.g. whites were
excluded) to create a composite variable of perceived discrimination towards racial-ethnic
minorities. Before this variable was created, an alpha test was performed that revealed a Cronbach
Alpha score of .78 between the four separate variables. Thus, combining the variables in this matter
was deemed appropriate.13 For the models that look at one racial-ethnic group at a time, perceived
discrimination towards the group for which the individual belongs is not included in the composite

13

An alpha test between all five variables yielded a much lower score of .5. Thus, perceptions of discrimination
towards whites was not included in the composite variable.

81

variable and is instead used as a control variable in the models.14 The average score for perceptions
of discrimination towards minority was a score of 2.96, meaning on average that respondents
perceive that minorities face some discrimination. Latinx Americans in the study, on average,
perceived discrimination towards minorities to occur most frequently (mean= 3.27) compared to
the other racial-ethnic groups in the study, followed by Blacks (mean=3.04).
Political Activity
The second independent variable used in this study measures the respondent’s level of
political activity. The NPS provided several questions to gauge an individual’s political activity.
These questions ask “In the past 12 months have you done any of the following: (1) “Did you take
part in a protest, march, or demonstration on some national or local issue (aside from a strike
against an employer)?” (2) “Did you work with other people to deal with some issue facing your
community?” and (3) “Did you participate in any groups or organizations, including your place of
worship, that are working to improve the conditions of racial or ethnic minorities?” Respondents
could answer “yes” or “no”. A “yes” response was recoded as “1” while a “no” response was
recoded as “0”. The sum was taken of a participant’s response to all three questions to create a
composite variable measuring their total political activity. Scores could range anywhere from 0
(e.g. no to all three questions) to 3 (e.g. yes to all three questions). The average score for political
activity was just under 1 activity at .7457 (std. .9139). Blacks appeared to be the most politically
active group, followed by whites.
Race-ethnicity

14

For example, in the model analyzing only Blacks, the perceived discrimination composite variable is the mean of
Blacks response to perceptions of discrimination faced by Asians, Hispanics, and Caribbeans. Perceptions of
discrimination towards Blacks is used as a control variable in that model. This approach is utilized for each racialethnic minority group. For whites, the same composite variable used in the full models is used in this model with
perceptions of discrimination facing whites being included as a control variable in the model to remain consistent
with the approach used in the other models.
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The last independent variable of focus for this study is race-ethnicity. Respondents were
asked “Which do you feel best describes your racial background?” This study includes individuals
who selected Black, white, Latinx, or Asian as their racial-ethnic background.
Control Variables
Several control variables are included in the statistical models. These controls are included
to adjust for differences in demographic measures that prior research has been found to factor into
individual’s attitudes concerning the topics of interest in this study. Those variables include
gender, education, nativity, political party affiliation, work status, and age. Gender is recoded to
reflect the responses of women with men as a reference category in the models. Education is
recoded to single out individuals with a four-year college degree or higher. Nativity compares
individuals born outside the US to those born in the country. Political party affiliation is recoded
to compare the responses of Republicans and Democrats to individuals who select any party other
than these two. Work status compares individuals working full time to all other work statuses.
Lastly, age is coded from 1 to 13. The value 1 represents individuals aged 18 to 24. The values
after 1 code age in 4 year increments up until the value 13 which represents individuals aged 80
and over. Table 1 details the mean for age as 7, which means that the average age of the respondents
in the sample is 50 – 54 years old.
RESULTS
Table 4.2: Cumulative Ordinal Regression for Race-Based Policy Across Predictors

NPS 2012 control

Racial Profiling
.278*
(.1245)

Detaining Immigrants Affirmative Action
.019
.194^
(.1079)
(.1133)

Perceived minority
discrimination

.510***
(.0846)

.282***
(.0793)

.473***
(.0810)

83

Political Activity sum

.279***
(.0610)

.149**
(.0509)

.154**
(.0518)

Black
(1=yes)

-.325*
(.1436)

-.428***
(.1227)

.808***
(.1241)

Latinx
(1=yes)

-.354*
(.1529)

-.394**
(.1372)

.386**
(.1405)

Asian
(1=yes)

-.369^
(.1978)

.059
(.1800)

.242
(.1833)

Woman
(1=yes)

-.054
(.1027)

-.366***
(.0926)

-.075
(.0944)

College Grad.
(1=yes)

.386**
(.1144)

.745***
(.1045)

.519***
(.1062)

Foreign Born
(1=yes)

-.622***
(.1383)

-.024
(.1296)

.200
(.1348)

Republican
(1=yes)

-.760***
(.1502)

-.917
(.1416)

.604***
(.1514)

Democrat
(1=yes)

-.040
(.1274)

.088
(.1013)

.354**
(.1030)

Working full-time
(1=yes)

.182^
(.1085)

.046
(.0972)

-.141
(.0992)

Age

-.051**
(.0173)

-.040*
(.0155)

-.028^
(.0151)

Pearson Chi Square

8043.118

5140.924

5439.810

N

1796

1796

1796

Source: NPS (2008; 2012)
Table 4.3: Cumulative Ordinal Regression for Moderators15

NPS 2012 control

Racial Profiling
.275*
(.1247)

Detaining Immigrants Affirmative Action
.021
.173
(.1084)
(.1126)

Perceived minority
discrimination

.482***
(.1027)

.301***
(.1003)

15

.234*
(.1004)

Control variables were included in this model; however, the coefficients are not shown to save for space.
Estimates for coefficients are available upon request.
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Political Activity sum

.141
(.3116)

.230
(.2675

-.958**
(.2970)

Black
(1=yes)

-.328*
(.1437)

-.428***
(.1227)

.807***
(.1243)

Latinx
(1=yes)

-.355*
(.1530)

-.393**
(.1372)

.372**
(.1410)

Asian
(1=yes)

-.369^
(.1978)

.057
(.1800)

.247
(.1837)

Minority Disc. *
Political Activity

.047
(.1028)

-.027
(.0856)

.363***
(.0944)

Pearson Chi Square

8036.634

5140.456

5496.866

N

1796

1796

1796

Source: NPS (2008; 2012)
Racial-ethnic Comparisons
The full models for the analyses are reflected in tables 4.2 and 4.3. Cumulative ordinal
regression was completed to get the results for these models. Concerning attitudes towards racial
profiling and detaining undocumented migrants suspected of terrorism, Black (-.325; -.428) and
Latinx Americans (-.354; -.394) are more likely than whites to support both policy initiatives,
when controlling for the demographic variables included in the model. Both groups are also more
likely than whites to favor affirmative action initiatives (Blacks=.808; Latinx=.386; p<.05). There
were no differences between whites and Asian Americans on any of the race-based policy
initiatives.
Perceptions of Discrimination, Political Activity and Race-Based Policy Preferences
Table 4.2 indicates that individuals that acknowledge racial discrimination against racial
minorities and those who are most politically active are more likely to oppose racial profiling
(.510; .279; p<.05), support affirmative action (.473; .154; p<.05), and reject detaining
undocumented immigrants suspected of terrorism (.282; .149; p<.05). The results of these analyses
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offer support for hypotheses 1 and 2. The interactive effects displayed in Table 4.3 indicate that
acknowledging racial discrimination against minorities more strongly associates with political
activists supporting race-based policies than it does for non-activists. This finding supports
hypothesis 3.
Table 4.4: OLS Regression for Intraracial Black Attitudes
Racial Profiling
2.360

Detaining Immigrants Affirmative Action
1.740
1.929

NPS 2012 control

.118
(.125)

-.010
(.139)

.189
(.121)

Discrimination on
Blacks

.147
(.095)

.095
(.102)

.074
(.088)

Perceived Minority
discrimination

.162
(.111)

.019
(.119)

.061
(.104)

Political Activity Sum .116*
(.053)

.067
(.058)

.106*
(.051)

Adjusted R square

.100

.037

.083

N

417

417

417

Constant

Source: NPS (2008; 2012)
Table 4.5: OLS Regression for Intraracial White Attitudes
Racial Profiling
2.902
(.222)

Detaining Immigrants Affirmative Action
2.269
1.017
(.266)
(.209)

NPS 2012 control

.170*
(.077)

.159^
(.091)

.066
(.072)

Discrimination on
Whites

-.141***
(.037)

-.257***
(.048)

-.137***
(.035)

Perceived Minority
discrimination

.275***
(.057)

.198**
(.067)

.261***
(.056)

Constant
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Political Activity Sum .122**
(.038)

.106*
(.046)

.069^
(.037)

Adjusted R square

.110

.247

.160

N

702

702

702

Source: NPS (2008; 2012)

Table 4.6: Attitudes toward Affirmative Action by Group
Racial Profiling
3.151
(.490)

Detaining Immigrants Affirmative Action
2.095
1.007
(.599)
(.453)

NPS 2012 control

-.114
(.145)

.090
(.171)

.073
(.137)

Discrimination on
Asians

-.146
(.123)

-.037
(.143)

-.043
(.113)

Perceived Minority
discrimination

.399**
(.134)

.239
(.155)

.341**
(.123)

Political Activity Sum -.061
(.089)

-.141
(.105)

.034
(.082)

Adjusted R square

.145

.081

.159

N

165

165

165

Constant

Source: NPS (2008; 2012)
Table 4.7: OLS Regression for Intraracial Latinx Attitudes
Racial Profiling

Detaining Immigrants Affirmative Action

Constant

3.061
(.296)

1.622
(.303)

1.580
(.260)

NPS 2012 control

.291
(.162)

.265
(.180)

.156
(.145)

Discrimination on
Latinx

.117
(.079)

.125^
(.085)

.079
(.070)
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Perceived Minority
discrimination

.046
(.087)

.053^
(.090)

.103
(.075)

Political Activity Sum .129*
(.060)

.092*
(.063)

.012
(.052)

Adjusted R square

.101

.036

.020

N

492

492

492

Source: NPS (2008; 2012)
Intraracial Attitudes and Policy Preferences
Tables 4.4 through 4.7 display the intra-racial factors that predict preferences for the racebased initiatives addressed here in this study. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analyses
were used to predict these models and graph the effects of the measures of greatest interest for the
study. The dependent variables are ordered in such a fashion that allows for use of OLS. The
strength of OLS regression is that it enables researchers to predict scores while controlling for
multiple control variables (Tabachnick and Fidell 2013). Used here, it can predict the score of the
independent variables necessary for an individual to theoretically fall in a particular category of
the dependent variables.
Among Blacks, there are positive associations for political activity on preferences for racial
profiling (.116; p<.05) and affirmative action (.106; p<.05), suggesting that more politically active
Blacks report more progressive stances concerning both policy initiatives than less politically
active Blacks. Among whites, perceptions of discrimination toward minorities are associated with
more progressive stances toward each policy initiative. Whites that recognize racial discrimination
against minorities are more likely to take progressive stances on each race-based policy initiatives
(.275; .198; .261; p<.05). Political activity is associated with more progressive stances towards
preferences for racial profiling (.122; p<.05) and detaining undocumented migrants suspected of
terrorism (.106; p<.05). Political activity was just short of being statistically significant at p<.05
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for affirmative action preferences. Whites were also the only group to display a negative
association for perceived discrimination against their group on policy preferences. This finding
suggests that the more whites perceive reverse racism, the more likely they are to resist race-based
policy initiatives.
Among Asian Americans, perceptions of discrimination toward minorities was associated
with more progressive stances toward racial profiling preferences (.399; p<.05) and affirmative
action preferences (.341; p<.05). Political activity was not a factor among Asian Americans when
estimating policy preferences. Lastly, among Latinx Americans, political activity was associated
with more progressive stances toward racial profiling preferences (.129; p<.05) and preferences
for detaining undocumented migrants (.092; p<.05) suspected of terrorism. Similar to the findings
for Blacks and whites, the most politically active Latinx Americans in the sample tended to hold
more favorable positions toward the race-based policy initiatives measured here than those Latinx
Americans who are less politically active. Hypotheses 4 was partially supported.
DISCUSSION
This study set out to test the potential of CIIM when predicting preferences for ostensibly
race-based policy initiatives. CIIM posits that in some circumstances, experiences with
discrimination lead members of racial-ethnic minority groups to characterize themselves with
members of other historically marginalized groups, which can possibly serve as an impetus to
commonality and cooperation between the groups (Richeson and Craig 2011; Craig and Richeson
2012). Few studies look at the association of perceptions of discrimination towards minority
members in general, even fewer studies look at how these perceptions relate to policy positions
that have racial implications, and no study that I have uncovered looks at how political behaviors
factor into these potential relationships. This study contributes to the social psychological literature
by embarking on all three endeavors while also controlling for the effect of perceived
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discrimination against one’s group to tease out the unique contribution of these constructs on racebased policy initiatives.
Results from the multivariate analyses reveal that a general awareness of mistreatment of
racial-ethnic minorities as well as increased political activity improves the likelihood that
individuals take a progressive position on race-based policy initiatives such as racial profiling,
detainment of undocumented migrants suspected of terrorism, and affirmative action initiatives.
Even when controlling for perceived discrimination against one’s group, the significant
associations found between the independent variables in the study and the proxies for race-based
political initiatives held in most cases. These findings add to common understandings of CIIM by
suggesting that not only is one’s own experience with racial-ethnic injustice a factor in that
individual forming a more positive image of other minorities, but what is also important is how
that individual views the position of historically marginalized groups in general and the amount of
political activities they engage in as well. The fact that the effect of those measures held even when
controlling for perceived group-discrimination demonstrates that net of personal experiences,
one’s worldview towards fairness and their actions to achieve fairness could be prerequisites to
future coalition building. These findings are of great importance in an environment where personal
experiences with racial-ethnic discrimination are more difficult to notice due to the changing
nature of these acts in the post-Civil Rights era (Kinder and Sanders 1996; Bobo et al. 1997;
Bonilla-Silva 2018).
The importance of political behaviors in estimating support for the initiatives used in the
study confirm arguments made by others in the past that coalition building is contingent on
individual’s willingness to mobilize politically (Du Bois 1992; Ture and Hamilton 1992; Dawson
2013; Mantler 2015; Bloom and Martin 2016). Moreover, findings detailed in the intragroup
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models for whites and Asians suggest that there may be potential for a multiracial coalition that
includes not only Blacks and Latinx Americans who have typically been the focus of studies of
this form. In contrast to most studies investigating potential alliances between groups and using
CIIM as a framework, this study demonstrates that more research needs to be invested into how
our social psychological theories help to estimate positions on policy prescriptions. Doing so not
only builds a case for what factors improve the likelihood of cooperation between groups, but it
also provides valued insight into what particular issues these groups can possibly organize around.
Said differently, future studies using frameworks such as CIIM should look to into potential
coalition building should also look to research the potential for those coalitions to materialize into
something concrete that would benefit people of color.
LIMITATIONS
There were many limitations that this study could not address. First, the latest date from
which the data was derived was the year 2012. While this data is not so dated that the findings are
not useful or instructive, it would be significantly beneficial to observe data derived during the
Trump era, which occurred alongside a resurgence of racial discourse not experienced in the US
for several years (Bonilla-Silva 2018). During this era, racial-ethnic discrimination targeting
groups such as Latinx Americans, particularly Mexicans, and Muslim Arab Americans has become
more apparent and intense. Issues such as the travel ban16 and the Trump Administration’s
handling of undocumented Mexican Americans at the border17 may have affected the way many
Americans judge the experiences of minority groups in the contemporary US. Thus, it would have

16

The Trump Administration issued a travel ban in 2017 that restricted entry into the United States from seven
mostly Muslim Arab countries. Recently, the ban has been expanded to include 13 countries, all of which are
predominantly Muslim Arab countries or African nations. See Sacchetti et al. (2020) for more information.
17
See Romero et al. (2019).
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been interesting to observe not only if the findings from this study held up when using more recent
data, but if those findings produce stronger relationships with the dependent variables.
Another limitation of the study and a possible direction for future research, is that the
methodology used to produce the results is not adequate for understanding the nuances of the
constructs used as predictors here. For instance, quantitative survey research is incapable of
providing insight on how individuals understand the discrimination faced by certain racial-ethnic
groups to be different. This point is an important one as historical research on Latinx, and African
Americans alliances has argued that in some circumstances, recognition of the other group’s
mistreatment led those groups to push for different and sometimes conflicting solutions (Foley
2010; Mantler 2015). The locus of these groups’ oppression is often divergent and thus recognition
of such may lead individuals not affected by that form of oppression to support different political
remedies to address it. Qualitative research could help us to better understand how the nature of
one’s understanding of an outside group’s marginalization affects how those individuals perceive
of possible solutions. Nevertheless, the current study accomplishes its goal by providing
information on how these very general perceptions relate to political opinions that an individual
may hold.
5. CHAPTER: WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE AND WHAT MEANS ARE
NECESSARY TO GET THERE?
The Civil Rights Movement and subsequent Black Power era, contrary to how they are
portrayed in popular media, were not social movements consisting solely of African Americans.
There was significant participation from Latinx Americans, white Americans, and even some
Asian Americans in each era of activism. Major wins such as school desegregation would not have
been possible without political mobilization efforts from Asian Americans (Okihiro 1994), Latinx
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Americans (Foley 2010), and of course, African Americans. After the 1960s, interracial social
activism was pivotal in the acquittal of Joan Little, a woman tried for the murder of a correctional
officer who had raped her while she was incarcerated (Davis 1981; McGuire 2010). White women
and Black men and women worked together for Little’s exoneration, which was seen in some
circles as the culmination of nearly a century’s long effort for Black women particularly and Black
people collectively to gain autonomy over their bodies (McGuire 2010).
Possibly influenced by knowledge of these efforts, and aware of similarities in the social
location of marginalized racial-ethnic groups, scholars have attempted to gauge the potential of
multiracial coalitions in contemporary times. Their thinking follows the logic that groups such as
Latinx Americans and African Americans have the least to lose, in terms of material resources,
and the most to gain from forming interracial coalitions with one another. On its face, that logic
seems to make sense. Black and Brown men account for about 60% of the prison population
despite both groups only accounting for about 30 percent of the United States’ population (Prison
Policy Initiative 2014). Both Blacks and Latinx Americans hold far less wealth, earn less income,
and own homes at much lower rates than white Americans (Pew Research Center 2013).
Furthermore, while these groups are overrepresented among inmates and homicide victims, they
are underrepresented in occupations well known for providing the most remuneration in terms of
finances, prestige, and influence (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2020). The genesis behind these
disparities include years of discrimination on the basis that people not born white were thought to
be of inferior stock and were unworthy of such American benefits (Horsman 1981; Harris 1995;
Lipsitz 2006). Thus, ostensibly, African Americans and Latinx Americans seem to be a “match
made in heaven” as political collaborators.
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Decades of social psychological research, however, seem to suggest the contrary. Any
cooperation between these groups and others have been short-lived and much of the research points
to Blacks and Latinx being more likely competitors than collaborators. In one study, Latinx
immigrants in North Carolina report being closer to whites than Blacks (McCain et al. 2006), and
other studies demonstrate Latinx immigrants reporting associating more negative than positive
qualities with African Americans (Mindiola et al. 2002). Some efforts to mobilize together have
involved tensions over real and imagined zero-sum competition. Some studies find that Hispanic
migration to the United States coincides with a loss of wages and an increase of incarceration
(Borjas et al. 2010) and violence for African Americans (Shihadeh and Barranco 2010). On the
other hand, a study of municipal employment demonstrates that Latinx Americans become
disadvantaged when working in areas that gain a substantial population increase of Blacks
(McClain 1993).
Other work rejects this idea, suggesting that, in most cases, African Americans and Latinx
Americans do not compete for the same jobs, so Hispanic migration does not pose a realistic threat
to Blacks and vice versa (Bean et al. 2011). Whatever the case, the perception that competition
over scarce resources exists between the groups undoubtedly skews their perceptions of one
another (Abascal 2015; Craig and Richeson 2018). Abascal (2015) reports that African Americans
begin to identify more with white Americans when presented with information of a Latinx increase
in population.
While Latinx immigrants consistently express more social distance from Blacks, US-born
Latinx Americans routinely view Blacks more favorably (Mindiola et al. 2002) and express a
linked fate with the group (Correa 2011; Hurwitz et al. 2015). These findings, however, are
complicated by the fact that the same measures found to improve perceptions of affinity between

94

the groups are also associated with competition between them (Correa 2011). Moreover, the ability
of racial-ethnic minorities such as Latinx Americans and Asian Americans to blend in with white
Americans (Bean and Lee 2007) and become privy to some of the “wages of whiteness” (Roediger
2007) have pushed some scholars to doubt the likelihood of the formation of a new age “rainbow
coalition” (Kaufmann 2003). For these scholars, the increased coloring of the United States racial
landscape will not erase the white supremacy that organizes the nation and arranges the
maldistribution of green dollars based on skin pigmentation. While I recognize the legitimacy of
this pessimism, this dissertation attempts to offer some light out of the dark abyss of current racial
politics.
Where to Go?
In Martin Luther King Jr.’s last book, he posed the question “where do we go from here”
to discuss the state of the Civil Rights Movement after the signing of the 1964 and 1965 Civil
Rights Acts (King Jr. 2010). This legislation had been a momentous achievement, but King
realized that it did not have the effect that it should, given the fact that Black’s still did not possess
the intrinsic resources needed to fully participate in a democracy. They were still largely
impoverished, America was entrenched in war with Vietnam, and the militant notion of “Black
Power” was becoming increasingly popular among Blacks, drowning out the more tamed message
of the less radical Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) of which King headed (King
Jr. 2010).
In 2008, the US has experienced another momentous achievement in electing its first
President of African descent. But like King realized then, there is still a long way to go before
Blacks in particular, and racial-ethnic minorities in general can claim self-determination. The
Economic Policy Institute (Jones et al. 2018) drafted a report on the current status of Blacks,
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displaying only modest improvements in some socioeconomic categories and declines in others in
comparison to their 1968 status—the year of King’s death. Pew Research Center (2013) displays
similar results when looking at the socioeconomic status of Latinx Americans and, to some extent,
Asian Americans. The assassination of an Iranian general may be a harbinger to another war
involving the US and internal strife domestically has led to the creation of militant groups like
ANTIFA (Anti-fascists) and Black Lives Matter. King’s 1967 question seems to be just as relevant
in 2020 as we are confronted with problems eerily similar to the ones he faced.
By Any Means
While there is enough hardship to go around, disadvantage falls heaviest on racial-ethnic
minorities. President Trump’s aggressive racial stances have alienated migrants to the US, which
puts Latinx and Asian Americans18 most at risk. These issues can be challenged through a
concerted collective effort by various racial-ethnic minorities to work together to achieve change.
Chapter 2 demonstrated that while groups such as Blacks and Latinx Americans do perceive
competition with incoming migrants, and that competition moderates nativist sentiments, they do
not do so in a specifically racialized manner. Said differently, the vulnerability of these groups as
laborers helps estimate their anti-immigration stances, not competition with groups such as Latinx
Americans and whites specifically. These findings suggest that there is room for common ground
between the groups.
Chapter 3 demonstrates that that commonality can be forged through politics. Second
generation Latinx Americans are more given to radical political techniques were more likely to
report commonality with racial-ethnic minorities such as Blacks and Asian Americans. While
numerous studies prior to this one focused on the way perceptions of discrimination by minorities
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The largest portion of US migrants in order derive from Mexico, China, India, the Philippines, and El Salvador.
These are all Latin American and Asian countries (Pew Research Center 2019).
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related to commonality with other minorities, this study identified another important predictor of
affinity between groups that had not yet been explored. Findings detailed that Latinx Americans
who hold a more encompassing view of the political means necessary to generate change are more
likely to express an affinity for other racial-ethnic minority groups. Not only did the relationship
between this measure and commonality hold even when controlling for perceptions of
discrimination, it was also found to moderate perceptions of discrimination. Thus, the positive
relationship consistently found between perceptions of discrimination and affinity with other
minorities is strongest among Latinx Americans with the most radical imagination for political
tactics necessary for change. I argue that a possible reason this measure is related to commonality
between racial-minorities is due to a history of interracial coalition building that was generally
motivated by the radical politics of the groups. Potential collaborators were not only attracted by
the common experiences they shared with other groups, but the methods they used to transform
the political landscape (Mantler 2013; Dawson 2013; Bloom and Martin 2016).
Chapter 4 took these findings a step further by estimating how these measures related to
policy preferences. The potential for commonality between racial-ethnic minority groups is
fruitless if it does not aim to produce material gains for disadvantaged populations. Therefore, it
was important for social psychological research to investigate if the measures associated with
increased affinity between groups have any bearing on the policy positions that individuals take.
The material circumstances of individuals, short of a political revolution, is most changed through
policy creation and enforcement. Building on the work in chapter 3, chapter 4 included not only
individual’s perceptions of political techniques as a measure but their political actions as a
predictor of preferences for ostensibly race-based policies. It also investigated the relationship
between individual’s perception of racial-ethnic minorities experiences with discrimination and
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policy preferences. Both measures detailed positive associations with progressive stances on racebased policy attitudes. The variables also demonstrated interactive effects, suggesting that, like
with chapter 3’s findings, the positive relationship between perceptions of discrimination toward
racial minorities is strongest among the most politically active individuals. Separate analyses run
by race, demonstrated that the effects of these measures are consistent among groups like whites
and Asian Americans as well as Blacks and Latinx Americans. The findings suggest that the
potential for a multiracial alliance may not be as bleak as other studies suggest.
Limitations: Methodology and Analyses
The general limitations of quantitative research that utilizes secondary data analysis are
apparent in this dissertation. Perhaps, the greatest limitation relates to the questions that can be
asked and answered. If the power to ask questions is the greatest power of all, as afro-pessimist
Frank Wilderson (2015) presumes, then it could be said that a method which does not allow the
researcher to engage their own questions offers no power at all. Many of the establishments that
Robert Allen (1992) once critiqued in his book Black Awakening in Capitalist America, for funding
neocolonialism in urban ghettos, also fund many of the expansive, financially taxing, painstaking
surveys that provide the data from which we researchers analyze and test hypotheses. That said,
there may be a reticence to ask the penetrating questions that could potentially scrutinize the very
establishments making some of our research possible. I acknowledge that some important inquiries
that I would like to engage which include prompts that gauge not only if one perceives a group to
have been mistreated but who or what do they believe is responsible for the mistreatment, are not
present in most surveys.
However, the fact that some of the more piercing questions that researchers may want to
analyze are absent from most surveys does not mean that the work produced using this data is
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without value. There is much that can be gleaned from observing the data in its present form.
Attitudes concerning what some radical scholars and activists may consider reformist positions
could help us to infer which positions individuals might take on more revolutionary programs.
More importantly, quantitative research affords researchers the ability to generalize their findings
to a much broader population. This dissertation was concerned with understanding the political
opinions and behaviors of racial-ethnic minorities on a large scale in hopes that they can provide
some prescience on the political possibilities of a soon-to-be majority colored US nation. I
attempted an empirical investigation of a theoretical picture that others before, have painted (see
Lee and Bean 2007 and Bonilla-Silva 2004). In doing so, I broached the question, “Could an
increase in the colored population coincide with a decrease in white supremacy?” If one is to infer
from the results of this dissertation, then the answer would be “possibly”.
Another limitation of the dissertation relates to the manner in which I define and analyze
racial-ethnic groups. Some US datasets, attempting to be representative of the general public,
possess samples of groups too small for researchers to disaggregate groups for more nuanced
analyses. This reality is especially problematic when researchers seek to analyze people of Latin
or Asian heritage. Small samples often force quantitative scholars to ignore important differences
within these groups that may be of significance to the respondents in question. Whether people of
Latin or Asian descent perceive themselves as belonging to a distinct racial group irrespective of
differences in nationality is an empirical question in itself. While research demonstrates that
groups such as white and Black Americans do not distinguish between nationalities when
observing these groups (Wilkinson 2009), and indeed others have argued that Latinx (Cobas et al.
2016) and Asian Americans (Zhou 2004) have been racialized in the US as a collective, the way
these individuals define themselves is of great importance. Future studies should emphasize
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observation of data with oversamples of Latinx and Asian Americans that includes measures of
nationality. These data could provide more insight into divergences of opinion within groups
whose differences are often obfuscated.
Directions for Future Research
My later work will look to address the limitations I have laid out above and to expand on
this work I have completed here. I look to observe datasets with more robust samples of foreignborn Blacks as well as Arab Americans. Blacks are generally treated as a political monolith. In
some instances, this treatment is justified as research demonstrates that a large majority of Blacks
support espouse similar political preferences and largely identify as Democrats (Dawson 1994).
The political similarities are consistent in this work as many of the independent variables used in
the selectively Black analyses were insignificant, demonstrating some political uniformity among
the race. But these examples generally look at Black Americans and do not include large enough
samples of foreign-born Blacks to draw comparisons. Foreign-born Blacks typically espouse
worldviews dissimilar from US-born Blacks, in some cases, and do not categorize themselves with
US Blacks upon migration to the country (Waters 1999). An increasing proportion of migrants to
the US are arriving from parts of Africa. Social psychology must accommodate these demographic
changes by analyzing the opinions of these individuals and the way those opinions shift as the
context in which they live shifts.
Regarding Arab Americans, my future work will look to observe how these individuals
perceive commonality and cooperation with other racial-ethnic groups. Some argue that the
racialization of Muslim Arab Americans has been a process that has spanned several decades
(Jamal and Naber 2008). Recent alienation of Muslim Arab Americans by the Trump
Administration has only intensified this outlook. Future research should look to investigate how
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Muslim Arab Americans’ perception of discrimination relates to their policy preferences and
affinity for historically aggrieved groups. Arab Americans share many similarities to Latinx and
Asian Americans. Their appearance and socioeconomic status afford them a proximity to
whiteness that provides some benefits, both material and symbolic (Cainkar 2008). However, in
some circumstances, they are racialized and treated as “the other” when they exhibit cultural
adornments like the hijab (Selod 2015). The racial profiling some Arab Americans experience
while flying (Alsultany 2008) in some ways resembles the treatment accorded Blacks while driving
(Bates and Fasenfest 2005). Their proximity in urban spaces to other racial-ethnic minorities and
increasing presence in the US demands greater attention from social scientists doing work on
intergroup relations.
In conclusion, there is much more work that needs to be done before social scientists have
a great understanding of what the demographic changes in the US mean to our political future.
Some have noted that the US racial order is transforming from its traditional biracial model,
characterized by divisions between whites and non-whites, to something different altogether
(Bonilla-Silva 2004; Lee and Bean 2007). It remains to be seen if this transformation leads to a
fairer and more just society.
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